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Abstract 
We consider the differences in income distribution between market and 
planned economies in two ways. First, using benchmarks from the OECD 
area we review evidence from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union during the socialist period.  Second, we look at 
the transitions currently being made by the latter.  In each case we review 
available data and the problems they present before considering in turn (i) the 
distribution of earnings of full-time employees, (ii) the distribution of 
individuals’ per capita household incomes, and (iii) the ways in which the 
picture is altered by non-wage benefits from work, price subsidies and social 
incomes in kind.  For the socialist period we are able to consider long series 
of data, often covering several decades, and we can thus show the changes in 
the picture of distribution under the socialist system. We also emphasize the 
diversity across the countries concerned.  For the period of transition, itself 
incomplete, the series are inevitably shorter but we are able to avoid basing 
conclusions on evidence drawn from single years. The picture during 
transition, like that under socialism, is varied.  Russia has experienced very 
sharp increases in measured inequality to well above the top of the OECD 
range.  The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have seen more modest 
rises.  We note the lack of a satisfactory analytic framework in the literature 
that encompasses enough features of the transition, a framework which 
would help interpretation of the evidence. 
 
Keywords: income distribution, socialism, transition 
JEL classification: D31, P2, P5. 
1.  Introduction 
Other chapters in this Handbook consider long runs of data for several 
countries. In a number of cases these reveal significant and essentially 
permanent shifts in the interpersonal inequality of earnings or income. Such 
shifts are sometimes associated with major events such as wars or 
revolutions. This chapter considers such an event  – the collapse of 
communist central planning in Central and Eastern Europe – which is, as we 
show, having substantial effects on income inequality in several of the 
countries. We are not in a position to document fully the extent of the 
changes, as the process of transition is incomplete, let alone their durability.  
Nor do we consider poverty, although we refer to changes in national income 
which, together with increasing relative inequality, would imply very serious 
increases  in the successor states of the Soviet Union and several other 
countries in the region.  
While for some purposes our sample includes all fifteen post Soviet 
Republics of the former Soviet Union as well as Poland, Hungary, and 
former Czechoslovakia, we concentrate mainly on these three (or four after 
the separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics) and Russia (or earlier the  
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whole Soviet Union). We thus exclude China and Vietnam and take a 
narrower view of “transition” than one might of “emergence”. 
The transitions of the formerly centrally planned economies into more 
conventional market economies have considerable implications for the 
distribution of income. Trading and middle-man activity is legal while 
private property ownership is also permitted.  In the transition itself, market 
disequilibrium is likely to prevail – generating large positive (and negative) 
quasi-rents.  Social institutions of redistribution and support through taxation 
and social services may break down or need to be radically recast. Keeping 
track of such a process, of which this chapter offers an account, is a major 
challenge. After some conceptual preliminaries we begin, however, in 
Section 2, with a reassessment of the starting point in the socialist economies 
relative to well-documented capitalist ones. This is not merely a 
recapitulation of what was already known but a reconsideration in the light of 
new data and analyses emerging from within the previously controlled and 
censored communities. 
The process of transition now in train is, however, not only incompletely 
documented, but is so far from complete in itself that we cannot identify 
clearly what it is a transition to – nor is it likely to be easy to recognise when 
it is over. In as much as the transition is to a social market economy 
characteristic of Western Europe, one needs also to recognise that that 
represents a moving target. Not only have measures of earnings inequality 
changed under the impact of changing technology and competition from 
newly industrialising countries, but institutions and redistributive policies 
have also changed with privatization, pressure to reduce tax rates and the 
ageing of the population. 
Within the transition economies themselves there was in many cases a 
sharp break as controlled prices and trading arrangements were swept away – 
on 1 January 1990 in Poland, 1 January 1992 in Russia and so on.  It is very 
important to recognise that however clean that break, it never represented a 
shift from a socialist to a capitalist (or from a controlled to a market) 
equilibrium.   
Through the 1980s macroeconomic disequilibria were intensifying 
throughout the COMECON area. In particular, excess demand, which was 
normal under central planning, increased, adding to monetary overhangs, 
black market premia on foreign exchange rates, and other indicators. These 
disequilibria increase the complexity of systems’ comparisons. How, for 
instance, should the accumulating stocks of private money balances be 
valued? 
The disequilibrium, which varied in intensity across the region, being least 
in Czechoslovakia and least repressed in Hungary, did not disappear  
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immediately when prices were liberalised and stabilisation programmes 
adopted. Relative to what had gone before, the disequilibrium of the last days 
of communism was largely monetary (though with the usual fiscal roots).  
The liberalised economies faced not only stabilisation problems but also 
those of industrial and financial restructuring. This affected the labour 
market, and hence the distribution of earnings, at many levels. It seemed 
likely that patterns of participation by sex and age would tend to converge on 
Western patterns. The sectoral structure of economic activity was likely to 
shift radically away from heavy industry towards services. A new financial 
sector would be called for and the massive state enterprises were likely to be 
reorganized into smaller and more specialised units capable of competing 
internationally.  Such a process of adjustment, with all its implications for the 
distribution of income, is bound to take time. The most that we can hope to 
do is to develop a framework for the analysis, recognising the key features of 
the varied starting points and range of possible, and shifting, destinations. 
As various authors have shown, and is confirmed in Section 2 below, there 
was by no means a single “socialist” model distribution of income, even 
within the COMECON area on which we concentrate.  Measured inequality 
was much less in Czechoslovakia, for instance, than in Russia. The extent 
and form of privileges f or the nomenklatura elites varied markedly and 
presented different degrees of difficulty for the statistician. These variations 
tempted some commentators, who had focused on particular socialist states, 
to conclude either that they were much more, or much less, equal than those 
of Western Europe. 
In market economies with pretensions to internal competition, we expect 
payments to factors and their owners to relate to the market valuation of the 
contribution of each input to output, the value of which is determined in a 
relatively free market. We then expect this distribution of pre-tax incomes to 
be translated into a distribution of post-tax and net real income by a 
tax/benefit system of social security contributions and benefits, and of direct 
and indirect taxation. 
Many Western social security systems include elements, such as the 
British National Health Service, involving benefits in kind, but factor 
payments are overwhelmingly in money.  This was much less true of socialist 
societies in which access to many social facilities, including housing, was, 
ostensibly at least, often linked to employment and the work-place. In both 
cases valuation of such benefits in kind is problematic. The scale of the 
problem, and its occurrence at the pre-tax rather than post-tax level, makes it 
a much bigger problem in the case of the socialist economies. Moreover, the 
problem accumulates since cost of provision, in which wages have been very  
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large, is a natural starting point for valuing the services which are themselves 
a component in labour compensation. 
Not only was payment in cash supplemented by extra payment in kind but 
the cash itself did not give a simple command over goods – the supply of 
which to individuals was frequently subject to constrained availability at 
controlled prices.  This raises a number of questions, many of which impinge 
primarily on the measurement of the price of a consumer goods basket. 
Obtaining rationed goods might involve extensive periods of queuing. How 
should that be regarded, as an input other than work-place time, or as a cost 
of consumption additional to the cash price of the goods in question?  Such 
factors are important if there are privileged agents with access to shops in 
which goods are more readily available, who have to wait less long for 
consumer durables, or who have privileged access to education, health, 
foreign travel or other services, such as those of a dacha. 
Moreover, out of equilibrium, when money wages might exceed the 
“price” of the basket of rations, how should the unspendable excess cash be 
valued?  By reference to returns on savings deposits? The prospect of rations 
being increased at some future date? Or the price of goods on the black 
market? 
Along with rationing and privileged access to goods and services goes an 
incentive to obtain goods beyond one's ration or access to privileges to which 
one is not entitled.  This corruption and black market operation is relevant for 
two distinct reasons. First, if the black market is extensive enough it may 
supply a set of market prices and, in the extreme, the rationed quantities 
available at a lower official price become a per capita subsidy (a negative 
poll tax) if everyone enjoys the same rations.  Second, corruption also means 
that officials may have significant income sources over and above their basic 
salaries as well as expenditures over and above those at officially controlled 
prices of some of their purchases. Of course, supplementary and second 
incomes from moonlighting or cultivation of gardens are not confined to 
senior officials but permeate many layers of different societies, including 
those in the West. 
Partly for these reasons the adequacy of official data for a full picture 
varied even while socialist economies appeared to be sustainable.  With the 
breakdown of these regimes the data problem has become worse, both as far 
as macro- and micro-economic data are concerned.  For both, the new 
smaller private enterprises are important, and machinery for collecting 
statistical returns from them has taken time to build.   Under central planning 
data on many things passed from enterprises to branch ministries – and the 
centre – as an administrative matter. For the new situation a very different 
procedure is necessary. 
In the context of economic and systemic transformation it is obviously 
desirable to be able to track the changing pattern of distribution; all the  
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problems of static systems' comparisons of Section 2 are made even more 
difficult in the process of transition examined empirically in Section 4.  Price 
jumps have big effects on real balances – should they be taken into account?   
Privatization involved the issuing of vouchers to citizens or to employees.  
How should these be valued and does their distribution constitute a part of 
household income?  These, and many similar questions, while important in 
principle, are rendered less relevant in practice by the fact that change in the 
early 1990s was much more rapid than the establishment of procedures for 
tracking some of the consequences. 
Section 3 picks up the conceptual theme with which Section 2 opens.  
Whereas the comparison of mature systems may rely on the concepts of static 
equilibrium analysis, the transition cannot. As a comparator, Section 3.1 
considers the consequences of the rapid liberalisation of a previously 
seriously distorted market economy – by reference to a two sector model.  
This analysis highlights the importance of the ex post substitutability of 
capital and labour and also of the degrees of heterogeneity and mobility of 
the labour force. It is suggested that market-clearing real wages would be 
liable to fall severely in realistic cases and in practice that serious 
unemployment would emerge. The scope for mitigating these effects by 
policy intervention is discussed in Section 3.2, while actual policies adopted 
to control wages and in response to unemployment are reported in Section 
3.3, social services and taxation in 3.4 and restitution in 3.5. 
Section 4 picks up the data story from Section 2 with sub-sections on data 
sources (4.1), the distribution of individual earnings (4.2), inequality of 
household incomes (4.3), and the distributional impact of remaining 
subsidies, non-wage income from employment, and social expenditures in 
kind from the state (4.4).  Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Income distribution in socialist countries 
In a market economy we can, as already indicated, look at the distribution of 
earnings, of property income, of wealth, of benefits in kind (typically as part 
of the education and health systems), and of cash transfers by way of taxes 
paid and benefits received by way of old age pensions, sick pay, 
unemployment benefits etc. In Section 2.1 we present some conceptual issues 
relating to the measurement of original and final income in non-market 
economies and some features of the allocation of labour under socialism, 
before examining data sources, which turn out to be relatively plentiful, in 
Section 2.2.  We then look in turn at evidence on the distribution of earnings 
(2.3) and of household incomes (2.4) in Central Europe and the former Soviet 
Union.  The section concludes (2.5) by considering what the evidence implies 
about the distribution of economic welfare and how the picture is changed 
when consumer subsidies and income in kind are taken into account.  
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§ 2.1 Labour income in market and socialist economies 
Typically the distribution of earnings is a dominant element in the overall 
distribution.  Earnings differentials reflect variations in hours of work and in 
hourly rates (which may in part reflect differences in shift length).  We also 
need to  take account of deferred pay represented by contributions to 
occupational pension schemes.  This is not an easy matter when pensions are 
related to terminal salaries rather than a return on contributions previously 
made.  Pay differentials in market economies are generally taken to reflect 
differentials in education, training and skills captured in the concept of 
human capital. The value of any particular skill at a point in time being 
determined by the interaction of supply and demand.   Changes in education 
systems and access to capital to finance periods of training will affect the 
effective supply of the more difficult-to-acquire skills.  
All of these factors contribute to earnings inequalities by age, sex, marital 
and occupational status discussed by Neal and Rosen in Chapter 7.  
Accumulation and inheritance of real and financial assets contribute to the 
distribution of wealth. Using either actual or imputed returns to wealth means 
that one can combine labour and property income into a single income 
distribution.  Whether this is preferable to presenting the joint distribution of 
earnings and wealth is questionable for several reasons.  If actual property 
income is used it is liable to be misleading. £1 of dividend income on a low 
yielding growth stock is very different in security etc., from £1 of interest 
income from the bonds of a near bankrupt company. More systematically, 
few surveys take the effect of inflation on yields on property into account. 
In one idealised model, investment in human capital might be driven by 
students themselves with access to good information and a ready supply of 
finance obtainable on the security of the human capital being acquired.   This 
would allow returns to human capital to be equated with those on its other 
forms only if very high personal debt ratios were acceptable or if equity-type 
claims on human capital could be sold.  Neither condition has ever come near 
to being met.  (See Chapter 8 by Piketty). 
If the conditions of market efficiency are to be met, then intervention is 
necessary to get the right education and training to the right people  – 
intervention which may take externalities as well as private returns into 
account – an intervention which is, in principle, as plausible in a socialist as 
in a market economy. R ussia in fact developed proportionately more 
specialist schools for young musicians, gymnasts and mathematicians than 
was typical of Western Europe. 
In addition to rewards for cultivated human capital, there are, in market 
economies, rents earned by “stars”, not only in sports and entertainments but 
also in certain professions. Some such rents, as to the tallest basketball 
players, have a physical and objective basis in the number of points they can 
score.  Even then the top scorer may earn a premium disproportionate to the  
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margin of points.  In cultural areas there is no objective scale for the margin 
by which the “best” operatic tenor outperforms the second best. To some 
extent it is a matter of fashion and taste how far audiences regard one as a 
substitute for the other and what premiums they are prepared to pay to hear 
“the best” – or the best paid (see Rosen, 1981).  Socialist economies were not 
immune from these pressures for three reasons: they were anxious not to 
appear too philistine, they needed to motivate performers, and they needed to 
prevent their emigrating in the course of foreign tours promoting the national 
culture of the socialist state. 
In many socialist countries there was a formal structure of pay norms 
across industries with higher rewards for those involving muscle power, such 
as mining or heavy engineering, and much lower rewards for activities such 
as medicine or education which were physically less demanding – and often 
disproportionately employed women. Within hierarchies there was a lso a 
prescribed graduation based on qualifications, seniority and responsibility – 
applicable to fringe benefits as well as to basic pay – not very different from 
Western organizations of a comparable scale in the 1960s and 1970s. As has 
already been mentioned, although the arts, and sports (when not undertaken 
through the military), were not rated highly in the structure of industrial pay 
norms, there was flexibility to pay large differentials for internationally 
mobile stars or winners of Lenin prizes or other such distinctions.  
On one view, labour allocation under socialism was quite different from 
that in a market economy. This view appears to be given support by the 
description of allocation of labour resources in urban China:  
“Since 1957 the state labour bureaux have exercised a virtual monopoly over the 
allocation of urban labour.  The scope for individual expression of preferences is very 
limited, even in the 1980s: job assignments are made normally without regard to the 
wishes of either employer or employee...The initial assignment to a job is very 
important: the first job is often the last...Without official consent – rarely granted – a 
change of employing unit is practically impossible.” (Knight and Song, 1990, p.9) 
But our concern in this chapter is not with the form of socialism that 
emerged in China.  In the case of the Soviet Union, Marnie notes similar 
rigid controls on labour allocation in the 1930s but she goes on to explain 
that the post-war period was very different: 
“Although the Soviet literature never referred to a “labour market”, labour allocation 
was in fact predominantly achieved through market mechanisms. Since the mid 1950s 
workers in the Soviet Union have been free to quit their jobs at will. Only a small 
share of jobs are centrally allocated; otherwise employees are free to choose their job, 
skill, or profession, as well as the region where they work.  ... and, although a state 
employment service has existed since the 1960s, it has never had a monopoly over the 
allocation of labour” (1992, pp.38-39).  
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This picture serves also as a reasonable description of the allocation of 
labour in many other Eastern European countries under socialism, although 
there was some notable variation within the region.
1 Yugoslavia’s form of 
economic organization with worker managed firms is an obvious outlier.  On 
this different view, the allocation of labour in these countries and in post-war 
USSR may be seen in terms of departures from a market allocation, rather 
than as a totally different system. 
One significant difference was in the degree of centralised wage 
determination, but it was argued by various authors that in view of the 
relative freedom enjoyed by workers in their choice of job, the setting of 
differentials was in part concerned to provide incentives similar to those in a 
market economy, as noted above.  For example, Phelps Brown (1977) reports 
that wage differentials were set with regard to incentives to invest in human 
capital, to enter occupations with unpleasant conditions, to bear 
responsibility, to work hard on the job, and to move to industries or areas 
selected for an expansion of employment.  The desire to overcome labour 
shortages, such as those for skilled labour, may have meant that wage 
differentials departed less than might be expected from those which would 
have characterised a market economy at the same level of development. 
However, some departures there certainly were.  Numerous authors have 
drawn attention to the differences in differentials by industry and occupation 
between economic system  – influenced in part by the reward to muscle 
power that has just been noted. A good example, that illustrates the impact of 
change of system directly, is provided by movements in differentials by 
sector in Czechoslovakia between 1948 and  1953 associated with the 
Communist take-over. These are shown in Table 1. The favourable position 
under socialism of manual workers relative to non-manual workers that is 
implied by these sorts of figures was frequently documented in the literature. 
Any reasonable account of the operation of labour markets under socialism 
would combine elements of the different views. And it is clear that the mix 
would vary between countries and across time. As a result, it is not surprising 
that simple conclusions about “the” distribution of earnings under socialism 
are elusive. The picture can be expected to vary substantially from country to 





1 The separation rate in manufacturing in the USSR in 1989 of about 18 per cent exceeded 
that in Japan, France, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands, with voluntary quits being the single 
largest cause of separations (IMF et al., 1990, Volume II, Chart 2 and Table IV.6.5).  The 
separation rate in Hungary in the mid-1980s exceeded 20 per cent (Hungarian Statistical 
Yearbook, 1987, Tables 4.4 and 4.8).  
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Table 1:  Earnings by sector in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and 1953 relative to 
the national average (per cent) 
 
          1948    1953 
 
  Manufacturing        92.7    108.0 
  Construction      101.2    115.2 
  Transport      109.4    110.3 
  Trade/catering      102.5      90.0 
  Health/Social Welfare    120.9      92.2 
  Education and Culture    124.7      90.0 
  Banking and Insurance    134.7    104.3 
Source: Veèernßk (1991, p.238). 
 
When looking at earnings inequality one has to decide on the relevant 
population.  Is it those in employment or those who are seeking employment?   
And if so how should they be identified? Or should one consider the whole 
population – perhaps of “working age”? If one considers the population of 
working age, comparisons may be affected by relatively arbitrary differences 
in what constitutes “working age”. Even if this difference did not exist 
differences in participation rates can become very important. The socialist 
economies had much higher female participation rates at nearly all ages.  
This makes for a more equal personal distribution of income. Evaluating that 
difference, however, depends enormously on the explanation of the 
differential participation. 
Conscripting housewives without providing care for their children could 
equalize income but not necessarily even the lowered level of welfare.  
Virtual conscription, for fear of being called a “parasite”, with child care of 
uncertain quality, leaves comparisons difficult to make.  Is relatively low 
participation of mothers in much of Western Europe – though much higher 
than it was – due to inadequate access to childcare (by whatever criterion) or 
due to choice in an affluent society (though that is difficult to square with 
trends in societies said to be getting richer)? Similarly, variations in age-
specific participation rates may reflect healthy investment in human capital 
or study as superior only to unemployment. Early retirement may be an 
affordable luxury or a statistical gimmick designed to reduce recorded 
unemployment. 
Recorded unemployment was very much lower in all centrally planned 
economies even than the rates below 5 per cent achieved in the 1950s in 
much of the OECD area. Since 1975 rates in the West have been nearer to 10 
per cent while rates in the COMECON area showed little change while that 
institution, and central planning, lasted.  As many of the transition economies 
have specified Western European models as their goals, the transition seems  
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likely to be associated with manifold increases in recorded unemployment 
quite apart from the rises of rates into the high teens in the early 
disequilibrium stages of the transition process. Any profile of income 
inequality over the transition must take into account the higher incidence of 
unemployment and the adequacy, or otherwise, of unemployment 
compensation. 
To some extent the contribution of open unemployment to income 
inequality may be associated with a decline of reported inequality of earnings 
among the employed if the latter included people on zero-hours or drawing 
minimum wages that were only 10 per cent of the average – as has been 
reported of the USSR. On the other hand, in several countries, particularly in 
Central Europe, the introduction and extension of market forces is increasing 
the inequality of earnings as incentive mechanisms play a growing rôle and 
as abnormal quasi-rents are earned on skills now in very short supply – 
supply which will presumably respond to the (temporary) reward. 
In both market and planned economies, taxes, subsidies, transfers and 
benefits in kind mean that one has to distinguish between the distribution of 
gross or (“original”) income and that of net income, expenditure or 
consumption. Even if we are particularly concerned with the latter it may be 
interesting to know whether country A's more equal distribution of net 
income arises from greater original equality or more radical intervention.  
Unfortunately it is difficult to invoke this distinction especially when making 
comparisons across systems. Ideally, and consistently with the 
Diamond/Mirrlees (1971) prescription for production efficiency, there might 
be no taxes or subsidies impinging on pre-tax incomes. In practice there are 
many in a ll economies, from trade taxes on intermediate goods to excize 
duties levied at the wholesale stage or subsidies paid to “producers”. 
Socialist economies typically made more interventions at this stage, 
including the effects of price and wage controls, which sometimes made 
explicit personal income taxes redundant. Thus it is likely that reported 
“original” incomes were more influenced by policy in socialist than in market 
economies so that the identified contributions of policy to the determination 
of the net distribution is likely to be understated. Socialism was in principle 
particularly inimical to private wealth holding and its passing between 
generations in the form of inheritance which is, potentially, an important 
influence on income distribution in several ways. Obviously inherited wealth 
is one source of property income. Parental income or wealth can be used to 
buy human capital for the next generation and parental influence may affect 
children's access to earning opportunities. 
Direct intergenerational transfers were typically relatively small in 
socialist economies as accumulation of personal assets was less significant.  
The successful manager's dacha was not bought but occupied on employment 
related terms  – more of an annuity than a freehold. The  blocking of  
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significant monetary bequests may merely have increased the importance of 
parental influence in securing places in the right schools, universities, and 
enterprises.  At times, preference for the children of workers and peasants 
may have limited or even eliminated the scope for parental influence but that 
does not seem to have been typical of Eastern Europe or the USSR since 
1950. 
§ 2.2 Data sources on income distribution under socialism 
The newcomer to the empirical investigation of income distribution in 
socialist countries may be surprised by the amount of evidence that exists on 
the subject.  Surely the state suppressed discussion of the extent of inequality, 
with the result that information on the distribution of earnings and of 
household incomes was not available? 
Statements over the years by Western and Soviet writers alike bore 
witness to the lack of available information on the distribution of income in 
the USSR.  For example, the discussant of a paper on Soviet income 
distribution that was  presented at a 1964 meeting of the International 
Economic Association noted ironically that he wished the author could have 
given his readers some idea of the extent of the size distributions of earnings 
and household incomes (Marchal and Ducros, 1968, p.236).  And in his 1984 
survey article on income inequality under state socialism, Bergson concluded 
that “the Soviet government apparently prefers to withhold rather than to 
release information” (1984, p.1091).  Can, then, the distribution of income in 
under socialism in Eastern Europe be investigated in any serious way?
2 
Data on the distribution of earnings and of household incomes were 
collected in the USSR in great quantities in the post-war period and in other 
communist countries too.
3  The Soviet Family Budget Survey (FBS), with its 
origins in surveys of the 1920s, was in continuous operation in the post-war 
period, and by the break-up of the Union in 1991 had a sample of some 
90,000 households.  Regular enquiries into the distributions of earnings and 
household incomes in Czechoslovakia and Hungary began in the late 1950s 
or early 1960s. 
The problem facing scholars of the USSR was the lack of availability of 
the data, the results from which were indeed systematically suppressed.  
Researchers were forced to work with what few scraps were available and in 
doing so displayed considerable powers of detection and ingenuity.
4 Notable 
 
2  Following the convention in much of the literature on the socialist period, we use “Eastern 
Europe” to refer to all of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
3  The situation in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the USSR is documented in 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), which we draw on here, and a substantial amount of data for 
these countries is contained in an appendix to their book. 
4  A good example is the reconstruction of the Soviet earnings distribution by Wiles and 
Markowski (1971) from a graph with no scale in a Russian language publication.  
 
12 
use was also made of surveys of Soviet emigrés in the 1970s (much of this 
work is collected together in Ofer and Vinokur, 1992). 
It would be wrong, however, to suppose that the situation in the USSR was 
representative of that in all of the Soviet bloc. The statistical offices of 
several countries in Eastern Europe had a long tradition of publication as well 
as data collection. From  at least the 1960s onwards, the Polish, Hungarian 
and Czechoslovak statistical yearbooks contained considerable information 
on the distribution of earnings and of household incomes. Statisticians in 
these countries published their results on occasion in international journals.
5  
Moreover, the period of glasnost saw a sharp change in Soviet publication 
policy, resulting in greatly increased availability of data for the USSR in the 
late 1980s. 
A second preconception surrounding distributional data under state 
socialism is that the quality of available information was low. Using Britain 
as a yardstick, Atkinson and Micklewright summarize the data on the 
distribution of earnings in the Eastern European countries they cover as 
suggesting that “the similarities [with British data] are more striking than the 
differences” (1992, p.55). There were exclusions from the coverage of 
Eastern European sources, including the armed forces and, typically, full-
time employees of the Communist Party. Those working in the private sector 
were often excluded – the numbers concerned varied greatly from country to 
country, being very small for example in Czechoslovakia but more important 
in Poland. Those in small enterprises were often excluded. Coverage of 
agricultural employment, an important sector in most countries, was typically 
far from complete. And the earnings data in most countries relate only to full-
time workers and just to those working a full month. 
These exclusions are important to note, but may be no worse than in 
Western countries. The French  Declarations Annuelles de Salaires was 
estimated in 1982 to cover only three-quarters of all full-time workers due to 
a number of exclusions including employees in agriculture and state and local 
authorities (Bourit et al.,1983, p.29). The Portuguese  Quadros de Pessoal 
excludes those working in public administration by design and about 15 per 
cent of firms fail to provide information (Cardoso, 1997, p.22). The German 
IAB data based on social security registers excludes civil servants (Steiner 
and Wagner, 1996). The British New Earnings Survey lacks data on about 15 
per cent of full-time and a substantially higher fraction of part-time 
employees (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, p.53); one reason for this 
shortfall in coverage is the exclusion, as in the Eastern European countries, of 
many workers changing jobs around the time of the survey. The European 
Union earnings enquiry of 1995 had a host of exclusions (Eurostat, 1998), 
including persons working in small firms – a more important restriction than 
 
5  The article in Econometrica by Éltetö and Frigyes (1968) is one example.  
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in socialist countries given the different distribution of firm size in market 
economies. 
The quality of data on household incomes in socialist countries is less 
straightforward to relate, with substantial variation from country to country 
and between different sources within country.
6 The methodology of 
collecting household income data is more complicated than that of data on 
individual earnings. This is true whatever the prevailing economic system 
and it is salutary to consider the degree of success achieved by the British 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES), a long-running enquiry of high 
international standing.  After allowance for the average level of non-response 
to the FES (just under 30 per cent at that time), the shortfall in income 
aggregates recorded in the survey for 1977 from those shown in the national 
accounts was 6 per cent for earnings, 9 per cent for social transfers, a quarter 
for self-employment income and occupational pensions, and as much as a 
half for investment income (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1983). The last two 
types of income should not figure prominently in socialist countries, and the 
example cautions against judging data collected under socialism against some 
unattainable ideal. 
Survey coverage displayed considerable variation. Examples of good 
practice were provided by the Hungarian income survey, held every five 
years from 1963 to 1988, and the Czechoslovak microcensus, of which there 
were eight between 1958 and 1988.  Sample design in these surveys followed 
standard international methodology of multi-stage sampling intended to give 
each household an equal probability of selection (with the sole exclusion in 
Czechoslovakia of households with a member in the armed forces or the 
police). Response to these surveys was very good, with rates of 97 per cent in 
Czechoslovakia in 1988 and 91 per cent in Hungary in 1983. Achieved 
sample sizes were large – 100,000 households in Czechoslovakia and 20,000 
in Hungary. 
The other end of the spectrum is represented by the USSR Family Budget 
Survey (FBS), to which we referred earlier. The operation of the survey was 
shrouded in mystery for many years but sufficient was known for it to be the 
subject of considerable criticism by Western and Soviet scholars alike.  
McAuley (1979) argued that “statistics from this source have been rejected 
by many, perhaps a majority, of Soviet economists and statisticians as 
worthless” (p. 51). 
The sample design of the FBS was a major source of complaint, being 
“subject to a great many different biases, often severe and cumulative, [so 
that] the survey is highly unrepresentative of the population as a whole” 
(Shenfield, 1984, p.3). The survey had a quota sample of families of persons 
 
6  A number of countries collected data on incomes through more than one survey.  We give 
examples of the methodologies rather than trying to be comprehensive.  
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working in state enterprises and collective farms, the quotas over-
representing heavy industry and under-representing the services. One 
implication of the survey design is that households had a probability of 
selection proportional to their number of workers in covered sectors.  Some 
pensioner households were added to the sample in 1979 but it seems clear 
that pensioners remained under-represented (Atkinson and Micklewright, 
1992, p.267). Once in the survey respondents were asked to participate 
indefinitely – the survey was a panel with no planned rotation, implying an 
ageing sample and a further loss of representativeness. The reasons for the 
sample design were partly ideological, with the quotas reflecting a bias 
towards the “productive sectors”. Shenfield (1984) notes too that the 
development of probabilistic survey sampling in the 1930s and 1940s, for 
example the work of Mahalanobis in India, never penetrated the USSR in the 
Stalin era. 
The Polish budget survey was somewhere in the middle of the spectrum in 
terms of coverage, especially in its early years. Prior to 1973, the sample 
design had similarities to that of the Soviet FBS with the survey restricted to 
households of employees in the state sector, but in this year the survey 
changed to a territorial basis (a sampling frame of addresses rather than 
enterprises). However, households working in the private non-agricultural 
sector (about 10 per cent of the labour force in 1989) continued to be 
excluded. And response was well below the level of the Czechoslovak and 
Hungarian surveys mentioned earlier (no doubt in part due to the greater 
burden of participation in a budget survey), averaging 65 per cent at first 
interview during 1982-1989 and only 40 per cent or less prior to 1982 when 
rotation was introduced into the survey’s panel design (Atkinson and 
Micklewright, 1992, p.260, Kordos, 1996). By the 1980s the sample size was 
about 30,000 households. 
The concern about quality of data on household incomes in socialist 
countries extends beyond the issue of survey coverage.  Is the relationship 
between the state and its citizens one that encourages accurate reporting of 
incomes?  In particular, the view is often expressed that Eastern European 
data covered only “official” income and that “second” or “hidden” economy 
income was missing from the data. This is a genuine concern in view of 
discussion of the size of the unofficial economy, especially towards the end 
of the 1980s. The growth of the second economy in Hungary was discussed 
by many authors. Official estimates put aggregate illegal income in the USSR 
at some 9 per cent of GDP in the late 1980s (Vestnik statistiki, 1990, no. 6). 
Other estimates were significantly higher. Estimates based on a sample of 
Soviet emigrés suggest that up to a third of the urban population’s income 
came from illegal sources, although the representativeness of the sample may 
be open to doubt (Grossman, 1987).  
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The questionnaires of household surveys in Eastern Europe typically 
allowed all forms of incomes to be reported but the success with which 
information on non-official income was collected is a matter for real debate.  
Under-reporting of this income is a serious qualification of the data collected.  
The success of statistical offices in capitalist countries in persuading 
respondents to reveal legally obtained income that has not been declared for 
income tax purposes may be an analogous problem. 
Some aspects of the statistical offices’ work were made easier by the 
nature of the socialist state. In all the surveys described above, earnings data 
provided by respondents were verified with their employers – something not 
possible in many non-socialist countries on grounds of confidentiality and a 
practice that has had to be abandoned in the transition. We have already 
noted the absence of some private income sources under socialism that 
appeared seriously  under-represented in British data. The less complex 
systems under socialism of cash transfers from the state, aiding the work of 
survey statisticians, should also be noted, although the more developed 
systems of consumer price subsidies that in part substituted for cash transfers 
in turn raise issues of interpretation of the income data that we return to 
below. 
Other aspects of data quality stem in part from the level of development of 
the socialist countries and in particular the importance of agriculture.  
Agriculture in the early 1980s accounted for 30 per cent of employment in 
Poland, 20 per cent in the USSR and Hungary and over 10 per cent in 
Czechoslovakia (ILO, 1984, p.89, and 1987, p.63). Notwithstanding 
collectivisation and the creation of state farms, many agricultural households 
consumed their own produce. The evidence suggests that “private plots” were 
often very important for non-agricultural households as well. Such 
consumption represents income and should be included in the calculations 
along with incomes in cash. 
The USSR Family Budget Survey required respondents to continuously 
record consumption of their own produce in diaries, which were regularly 
monitored by interviewers. It is clear that monitoring of this type is very 
onerous for respondents but it is likely to be more accurate than collecting 
information by recall, which is the practice in many Western countries, for 
example in the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys 
sponsored by the World Bank.  The Polish and Hungarian statistical offices 
followed different practices but clearly took the subject seriously (Atkinson 
and Micklewright, 1992, Sources and Methods). However, the Czechoslovak 
microcensus excluded this form of income.
7 
 
7  The dual price systems in socialist economies – a low official price at which goods have 
limited availability and a higher market-clearing price for private trade – had direct 
consequences for interpretation of income data, but it was also relevant for the valuation of 
income in kind.  Practice differed across countries, and the system applied by the Polish and  
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To summarise, the data sources available in pre-reform Eastern Europe 
appear to have been mixed in quality – just as in capitalist countries.  Data on 
the distribution of earnings compares favourably with Western sources while 
surveys on household incomes display considerable variation, the data from 
the former USSR being of much lower quality than those from several 
Central European countries. 
§ 2.3 The distribution of earnings in socialist labour markets 
A number of authors over the years have looked in detail at the size 
distribution of earnings under socialism and at the comparison with that in 
capitalist countries. The field owes a great deal to the study by Lydall (1968), 
in which he carefully assembled evidence for a wide range of countries for 
the period around 1960.To facilitate comparisons across countries, he defined 
a “standard distribution”, which related to the earnings of adult males, in all 
occupations, in all industries except farming, working full-time and for the 
full period. Earnings were defined to be money income from employment 
before tax or other deductions (Lydall, 1968, p. 60). 
The Eastern European countries covered by Lydall were Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. These same countries (particularly the first 
three) were often the focus of later authors too and it must be acknowledged 
that extensive evidence on the distribution of earnings (or of household 
incomes) over time is hard to find for Albania, Bulgaria and Romania.  
Lydall found that the least unequally distributed earnings were those in 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which appeared distinctly different from the 
Western European countries. Yugoslavia and Poland found their place among 
the group of Western countries with less inequality, such as Denmark and 
Sweden and, at that time, the UK. The data of Lydall were analysed further 
by Pryor (1973), who made explicit allowance for other systematic reasons 
why earnings dispersion may be expected to vary across countries, in 
particular that earnings inequality declined with the level of development and 
increased with the size of population. Allowing for these, he concluded that 
there was on average a six percentage point difference in the Gini coefficient. 
By contrast, Redor (1992), with more recent evidence, reached the 
conclusion that, comparing Western and Soviet-type economies: 
“there appears to be no systemic difference between the earnings dispersions of wage 
earners as a whole.  Although at the beginning of the 1980s the United States is the 
country with the highest earnings dispersion, both Western and Soviet-type 
economies occupy the ranks that follow.”  (1992, p. 60). 
                                                                                                                                            
Hungarian statistical offices seems reasonable.  However, official state prices were used in the 
USSR budget survey, thus under-recording the income of agricultural households and others 
with private plots and as a result probably overstating income inequality.  
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The evidence regarding the Soviet Union, in particular, is rather mixed.  
Pryor's figures for 1959 show the fifth percentile (from the top) in the Soviet 
Union as earning more relative to the median than the corresponding group in 
the US, the UK and other Western European countries (except France).  
More recent evidence was summarised by Bergson as showing: 
“a rather striking similarity in [earnings] inequality, as measured, between the USSR 
and Western countries.  Inequality in the USSR fluctuates in the course of time, but 
only rarely does any particular percentile ratio fall outside the range delineated by 
corresponding measures for Western countries.”  (1984, p. 1065). 
At the same time, he developed further the normalisation for differences in 
the stage of development and population size, and this led him to conclude 
that, allowing for such conditioning factors, “inequality in the USSR in the 
early seventies may have been somewhat low by western standards” (1984, p. 
1092).
8 
It is clear, therefore, that there were indeed differences between socialist 
countries of the Soviet bloc and that earnings inequality may have changed 
over time. These observations were the starting point for the work by 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), on which we draw here, that tried to put 
together consistent time-series on earnings inequality in Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland and the USSR, up to the end of the socialist period.  
Following Lydall, they defined a standard distribution to help comparison 
across countries, but, unlike him, focused on men and women together and 
included where possible agricultural employment (but not self-employment); 
their figures refer to monthly earnings of full-time workers before deductions 
and including any bonuses (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, p.79). 
Figure 1 shows the decile ratio (the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile) 
estimated by Atkinson and Micklewright for each of their four countries from 
the late 1950s to the late 1980s.
9  A benchmark was provided by the authors 
for these series with the analogous figures for Great Britain (the UK 
excluding Northern Ireland) for 1968-1990. Like some of the Eastern 
European figures, the decile ratio in Britain displayed considerable variation 
over time, with a minimum value of 2.87 in 1977 and a maximum of 3.65 in 






8  Bergson’s normalization follows the concept of the Kuznets curve, which is the subject of 
some debate – see Chapter 13 by Kanbur. 
9   It should be noted that these estimates were made from grouped data (and not microdata), 
raising issues of interpolation.  
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Source: Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), Tables CSE1, HE1, HE4, PE1, PE4, 
UE1, UE2. 
 
Czechoslovakia stands out in its low level of earnings distribution and the 
impression from Figure 1 is of considerable stability. Over 1959-1990 the 
decile ratio varied between 2.30 and 2.53  – well beneath the range for 
Britain.  As it was put by VeèernRk, “all the basic features of the structure of 
earnings inequality were established in the initial post-war period and firmly 
fixed for the future” (1991, p. 238).  But he went on to say that the stability in 
the distribution hid changes in the returns to human capital, which declined 
sharply in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and a shift in the age-earnings 
profile in favour of older workers. 
Next in the ranking comes Hungary, with a decile ratio above that for 
Czechoslovakia from the early 1960s onwards but still below the range for 
Britain. The figures for Poland display yet more variation, although in part 
this is associated with a change in the definition of the series in 1970. Prior to 
this year the decile ratio is at about the average level of that in Britain for 
1968-1990. The later period saw some sharp changes, especially in the 1980s 
with the changing fortunes of the Solidarity trade union movement. 















Top of the ranking comes the USSR. Only at the end of the 1960s does the 
decile ratio dip beneath 3.0 (associated with an increase in the minimum 
wage on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 1917 revolution) and for 
much of the period it is above the average British value. There is substantial 
variation, reflecting the mixed findings of earlier authors. And there was a 
steady increase in inequality in the 1980s, the decile ratio rising from 3.08 in 
1981 to 3.41 in 1989. 
Two former socialist countries shown in Figure 1 split apart in the 1990s.  
Were the points of departure for the constituent republics similar in terms of 
earnings inequality? In the case of the two halves of the Czech and Slovak 
Federation the starting point was almost identical. The decile ratios for the 
two republics in 1989 were both 2.14 and the Gini coefficients both 0.20 
(Atkinson and Micklewright, 1989, Table CSE5). Nor had there been 
differences of any size in the recent past – the overall degree of inequality in 
earnings had been similar for a long time (we will see below that the story 
was rather different for household incomes).  
In the case of the USSR, the sheer size of the country leads one to expect 
that the picture may not have been as for the Czech and Slovak Federation.   
Wiles (1974) suggested that the Union was formed of “a group of egalitarian 
regions, the  averages of which history has separated” (p.54). This would 
imply that inter-regional differences in earnings accounted for a substantial 
amount of the overall inequality and would help explain why the USSR 
comes top of the ranking in Figure 1. But it would also be the case that the 
starting points in terms of earnings inequality for the now independent states 
were fairly similar and that they were lower than for the USSR as a whole. 
Average earnings certainly did vary by republic; as a percentage of those 
in Russia in 1989 average earnings varied from 69 per cent in Azerbaijan to 
104 per cent in Estonia (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, Table UE4).  
Figure 2 sheds some light on intra-republic inequality, showing the decile 
ratio for each Soviet republic in 1986.   
The range is substantial, from 2.86 in Moldova to 3.46 in Armenia, but it 
is difficult to detect clear regional groupings, with the exception that the three 
non-Russian Slav republics  – Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova are at the 
bottom of the ranking. And although the variation is quite substantial, it is 
notable that even Moldova, with the lowest recorded dispersion, displays a 
greater degree of inequality than found in Czechoslovakia, Hungary or 





























Source: Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), Table UE5. 
 
 
To this point we have compared recent evidence from the Eastern 
European countries with that from Britain only. Figure 3 introduces several 
other Western countries into the comparison and in the case of the Eastern 
countries concentrates on those that will be the focus in Section 4 when we 
turn to the transition period of the 1990s. 
The evidence on the other Western countries is again for gross earnings of 
all full-time workers, but in other respects it is not fully comparable either 
with Britain or with the Eastern European countries, referring, for example, 
in the case of Canada and France to annual earnings.
10  The evidence for the 
Eastern European countries refers to 1986 or 1987, thus avoiding any 
changes in earnings inequality right at the end of the socialist period. The 





10   We have eschewed data for a number of other OECD countries given in the same sources 
that were even more obviously not strictly comparable. 
Figure 2: Decile ratio of gross monthly earnings for full-time workers: 






























































Notes: Decile ratio in brackets. Earnings are gross. 
Sources: Hungary (1986), Poland (1986), Russia (1986) and Britain (1990): Atkinson 
and Micklewright (1992), Tables 4.1, UE5, BE1. 
 
 
The diagram shows the top and bottom deciles relative to the median, with  
the decile ratios given in brackets after each country’s name. As already 
implied by Figure  2, Russia displays a markedly higher degree of earnings 
inequality than the other Eastern European countries. Figure 3 shows that this 
greater inequality arose at both ends of the distribution, although more 
notably at the top. The low level of Czech inequality results, in particular, 
from a difference at the top – the bottom decile as a percentage of the median 
is virtually the same as in Hungary. 
Among the Western countries, France and Germany have distributions that 
are more compressed at the bottom end than any of those in the Eastern 
countries. And the top decile in Germany as a percentage of the median is the 
same as that in Hungary, with the result that the overall degree of inequality 
as measured by the decile ratio is effectively the same as in the Czech 
Figure 3: Quantile ratios of earnings for full-time workers: East and West, end 
1980s 















11 Australia appears very similar to Poland, at both ends of the 
distribution. The overall degree of inequality in France is substantially less 
than that in Russia. Only the USA and Canada dominate Russia in terms of 
overall dispersion and in Canada even the top decile as a percentage of the 
median is the same as for Russia, the differences between the distributions 
appearing at the bottom. The shape of the distribution in Britain appears very 
similar to that in Russia. 
The comparison of the Eastern with the Western countries is undoubtedly 
sensitive to choice of year and to definitional issues. Nevertheless, the data in 
Figure 3 reflect the message coming from work of different scholars over the 
years. In the late socialist period, earnings i nequality in several Central 
European countries for which data were most readily available was towards 
the lower end of the range in Western countries, but not outside it. And in the 
case of Russia (and, on the evidence of Figure 2, some other former Soviet 
republics too), earnings inequality was already at a level well up in the range 
found in Western countries. 
§ 2.4 Inequality of household incomes under socialism 
The movement from evidence on inequality of earnings to that on household 
incomes involves a n umber of factors, and these may change the view 
obtained of the level of inequality under socialism compared to that under 
capitalism.  It may also alter the picture of how inequality changed over time 
under socialism. This is illustrated by Figure 4, which shows the decile ratio 
for the distribution of individuals by household per capita income in 
Czechoslovakia for 1958-88, together with the ratio for earnings of 
employees that was the focus of the previous section. Measured inequality of 
household incomes declined notably over the period, particularly between 
1958 and 1965. Whereas the decile ratio of per capita incomes was one and a 
half times that of earnings in 1958, the difference between the two had 
disappeared by the 1980s. Switching from the unit of the employee to that of 
the household and including other sources of income has changed the picture 
of stability in Czechoslovakia obtained from the earnings data for full-time 
workers. 
 
11  The German data refer only to full-year workers, which probably reduces the degree of 
inequality relative to that in the Eastern European sources.  But the picture given of Germany as 
a country with earnings inequality at a level similar to that in the Eastern countries with low 
earnings dispersion bears out that found with earlier data by some other authors. Redor, for 
example, reports a decile ratio of 2.3 for Germany in 1978 (Redor, 1992, Table 3.2).  The results 
comparing sources for the mid 1980s of Steiner and Wagner (1996) for the 80th and 20th per 
centiles indicate that earnings inequality is slightly lower in social security register data than in 
the household survey data used for Germany in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: Decile ratios for full time workers' earnings and for the individual 
distribution of per capita income: Czechoslovakia, 1958-1989 
Source: Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) , Tables CSE1 and CSI1. 
Under capitalism we would expect this movement to increase the 
measured degree of dispersion, due in particular to the presence of significant 
investment income, the existence of unemployment, and lower labour force 
participation rates than under socialism. None of this can be expected to be 
fully averaged out by moving to the unit of the household – indeed the 
opposite m ay be the case.  Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) find that the 
move from earnings of employees to per capita income of individuals leads 
to a rise in the Gini coefficient in the UK in 1985 of four percentage points.  
In Hungary and the USSR in the mid 1980s, however, there was effectively 
no change, as in Czechoslovakia at this time, although Poland proves the 
exception to the rule where the Gini rose by three points, more or less as in 
the UK.  Pyror (1973) concluded that the existence of property income raises 
the Gini coefficient in developed capitalist countries by between three and six 
percentage points compared to that under communism, although he went on 
to argue that this may not be the most important source of differences 
















the presence of cash transfers, although the design and hence redistributive 
impact of these may not be the same (and of course varies under capitalism). 
The suggestion is, therefore, that the move to household incomes may lead 
to more clear water between capitalism and socialism.  As with the evidence 
on earnings of employees, however, writers over the years have differed in 
their conclusions about the degree of measured inequality in household 
incomes under the two systems. 
Lydall (1979) concluded that there was little difference between the shape 
of the distribution of household incomes in the UK and that in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.  Morrisson (1984) reached a similar 
conclusion in a comparison which included in addition Bulgaria, Yugoslavia 
and the USSR, as well as a number of other Western countries, although it 
should be noted that his estimates included an approximate adjustment for the 
non-monetary privileges of the elite under communism (but not capitalism).  
Using data mainly from the early or mid 1970s, Poland and the USSR were 
found by Morrisson to have a relatively higher degree of inequality with Gini 
coefficients of 0.31 in both cases, but more or less on a par with Canada 
(0.30) and the USA (0.34). (The figures refer to the individual distribution of 
per capita household income.) The Gini for Hungary was estimated to be 
0.24, compared with 0.25 in both Sweden and the UK. Only Czechoslovakia, 
with a Gini of 0.22, was considered by Morrisson to stand out as having a 
more egalitarian income distribution than those in advanced Western 
countries. The ranking of the USSR accords with the conclusions of Bergson 
in his much-quoted survey of evidence about income inequality under Soviet 
socialism: “Income inequality in the USSR is commonly assumed to be less 
than that in the US. That is doubtless so, though not by so wide a margin as 
sometimes imagined” (1984, p.1073). 
The view that there was less inequality in pre-reform Eastern Europe than 
in Western countries was supported by the results of Wiles (1978). Using 
data for the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the decile ratio of per capita 
income as his measure of dispersion, he ranked (in ascending order) Bulgaria, 
Poland, Hungary, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, all of them firmly behind 
(again in order) Sweden, West Germany, the UK, Italy, Canada and the USA.  
This finding was in line with the conclusion of Pryor (1973) that holding 
other things constant, including level of development, the Gini coefficient of 
“total income inequality is at least 0.10 less in the East than in the West” 
(p.88). 
One reason for the differing views may be that the situation in the Eastern 
European countries changed over time so that the comparison depends on the 
particular  year chosen. The distributions of the different components of 
household incomes may change, as may household formation. Figure 4 
shows that the data from the late 1950s or the 1960s give a different picture 
of inequality of household incomes in Czechoslovakia than do the data from  
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the 1980s.  We consider changes for other countries below and return also to 
the issue of comparison with the West using more recent data. 
Before doing so, however, an important issue concerning adjustment of the 
data on household incomes needs to be made clear. The data on income 
distribution from communist countries typically refers to household incomes 
per capita.  The per capita adjustment for differences in household size is one 
not often made in official publications of Western income distributions, 
where an adjustment that instead embodies some economies of scale is 
usually made. Wiles, in his article referred to above, points out that Western 
data are often expressed in terms of total household income unadjusted for 
differences in household size, implying infinite scale economies, noting also 
that the Western data often refer to the distribution of households and the 
Eastern data to the distribution of individuals, that is households weighted by 
their sizes. The appropriate adjustment is a matter for judgement and the per 
capita scale may be more appropriate for socialist societies on account of the 
lower fixed costs of a household due to subsidised prices of housing and fuel 
(Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992). 
The sensitivity of results to the method of presenting the data is illustrated 




    Household distribution    Individual distribution 
    of total household income   of per capita income
   
  Hungary   5.43        2.82 
 
  UK    5.09        3.86 
 
Not only do the orders of magnitude of the two measures differ greatly, 
making vital the use of the same definition for comparisons, but the ranking 
of income inequality in the two countries differs on the two measures.  
Hungary appears more equal than the UK when using the definition of the 
distribution commonly used in the East, but less equal when using the 
definition commonly used in the West.
13 Similar findings were noted by 
Bruinooge et al., (1990) in their comparison of income inequality in Hungary 
in 1982 with that in the Netherlands.
14 
 
12 The figures are taken from Atkinson and Micklewright (1992, Tables HI3 and BI3). 
13  Note that an argument could be made for using different equivalent scales when making 
comparison between systems. If economies of scale in household size really do differ sharply 
between economic system then this could be taken into account when trying to produce 
comparable distributions of economic welfare.  
14  The same issue arises for comparisons of targeting under socialism and capitalism. 
Milanovic (1995) considers the incidence of social benefits in cash and in kind under both  
 
26 
We now turn to changes over time in the distribution under socialism, 
looking at the same countries that were the focus in our discussion of 
earnings.  Figure 5 shows the Gini coefficient for the individual distribution 
of per capita household income for Hungary, Poland and the USSR, and for 
Czechoslovakia, distinguishing in this instance between the Czech and 
Slovak republics.
15  
Figure 5: Gini coefficient for the individual distribution of per capita 
household income, 1958-1989 
Source: Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), Tables HI1, PI1, UI1, CSI5 (results for 
1964-85 for the Czech Republic and Slovakia calculated in the same way from data 
supplied by the former Federal Statistical Office.) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
economic systems. The concentration of cash incomes on the lower part of the distribution 
appears far better in market economies than in socialist economies (Table 17-2).  However, the 
data for the market economies refer to the distribution of total household income, unadjusted for 
differences in household size, while that for the socialist economies is for per capita income.  In 
the same volume, Jarvis and Micklewright (1995) show that the incidence of family allowance in 
pre-reform Hungary differed sharply between these two distributions, being much less well 
concentrated on the poor when total household income is used.  This would appear to suggest 
that Milanovic’s finding would be even stronger if the distributions in market and socialist 
economies were defined in the same way, but it is pension expenditure that dominates the cash 
benefit figures and here the result could go the other way. 
15 The Gini coefficient for Czechoslovakia as a whole is given for each year in Atkinson and 























The Polish and Soviet data refer only to the 1980s although the series for 
Hungary, like that for Czechoslovakia, covers three decades.
16 The sources 
for the data were described in Section 2.2 and the warning made there about 
the source of the Soviet data, the Family Budget Survey, must be repeated 
here  – this was a low quality source with a large question mark over its 
degree of representativeness. 
The most striking feature of the diagram is the reduction in income 
inequality in Slovakia from the  late 1950s to the late 1970s, the Gini 
coefficient falling by 0.1 – a very substantial change. The Gini in the Czech 
half of the Federation was nearly 7 per cent points below that in the Slovak 
half in 1958. At this time there were therefore sharp differences in income 
distribution between the two republics but by the mid 1970s recorded 
inequality was effectively the same. The reduction in intra-republic 
inequality in Czechoslovakia over 1958-88 was accompanied by a big catch-
up in average income by Slovakia. The ratio of average per capita income 
between the two republics fell from 70 per cent in favour of the Czechs in 
1958 to a differential of only 10 per cent from 1976 onwards (Atkinson and 
Micklewright, 1992, Table CSI4).  
In the mid 1960s recorded inequality in Hungary was at about the level of 
that in Slovakia, and movements in the Gini at this time were similar to that 
in the Czech lands.  By 1982 the Gini had fallen to 0.21, the same figure as 
for Czechoslovakia as a whole in 1980. The difference in experience between 
the two countries in the mid 1980s was striking. While inequality in 
Czechoslovakia was effectively unchanged, there was a sharp increase in 
Hungary, with the Gini coefficient rising by three and a half per cent points 
between 1982 and 1987. Rising inequality during this period in Hungary is 
consistent with the relaxation of central planning in the 1980s and we have 
seen earlier that earnings inequality increased at this time.
17 
The series for Poland starts only in 1983 so the impact of the Solidarity 
trade union in the early 1980s cannot be seen. The incomes policy package of 
Solidarity following the Gdansk Accord of 1980 was described by Flakierski 
as “one of the most egalitarian programmes ever defined in a socialist 
 
16 The Soviet evidence for earlier years is sparse but includes the important work by 
McAuley (1979) for 1967, drawn on by several later authors including Bergson (1984) and 
Morisson (1984), and that of Ofer and Vinokur (1992) who used data collected from samples of 
emigrés in the early 1970s.  Atkinson and Micklewright argue that the differences in sources and 
the uncertainty surrounding their use are too great to allow strong statements about trends in the 
USSR up to 1980, concluding that all one can say is that the degree of inequality displayed by 
the Family Budget Survey data for 1980 is “fairly similar” to that found in the earlier work 
(1992, p.131). 
17  Éltetö (1997) discusses in detail the changes in income distribution in Hungary over the 
1970s and 1980s, comparing these with those for earnings.  He notes that the correlation between 
an employee's earnings and the per capita income of his or her household was only 0.35 in 1977 
and 1982, a reminder of the difference between the two income concepts.  
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country” (1991, p.96) but although a separate series for worker households 
shows a sharp drop in inequality between 1981 and 1982, there was a rise 
again in 1983 (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, Figure 5.7). Figure 5 shows 
that recorded inequality in the population as a whole at this time was clearly 
greater than in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia.  With the exception of a 
jump in 1989, inequality in Poland during the period shown did not exhibit 
any great changes and the Gini in 1987 was effectively the same as that in 
Hungary. 
Figure 5 shows inequality in the Soviet Union rising throughout the 1980s, 
starting from the same level in 1980 as displayed by Poland for 1983 – a Gini 
coefficient of just under 0.25. The value by 1989 was some three per cent 
points higher. The question mark over the Soviet data reduces any confidence 
that can be placed in the comparison of the level of inequality with that in the 
other countries, but the changes over time during the decade may be more 
robust to deficiencies in the source. Putting such concerns to one side, the 
evidence of Figure 5 is that inequality of household incomes in the USSR at 
the end of the 1980s was, like that of earnings, higher than in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. 
Did socialism reduce regional disparities in incomes across the USSR as 
we have seen occurred in Czechoslovakia? And what was the degree of 
disparity in income within each republic at the time of the break-up of the 
Union? McAuley (1979) analysed changes in available data on average 
incomes by republic in the 1960s and concluded that there had been “little if 
any” (p.99) reduction in regional differences. Evidence for the 1980s is given 
by Atkinson and Micklewright who note that seven out of the eleven non-
Baltic republics had failed to make any significant progress relative to Russia 
and that a number had fallen further behind, notably in Central Asia where 
the four core republics in 1988 had average per capita income of less than 
two-thirds of the Russian figure. 
Questions concerning the differences within republics are harder to 
answer. The only data readily available are for the end of the 1980s and come 
once again from the Soviet budget survey, which had a small sample size in 
several republics (less than 1,500 households in five cases). With these 
caveats, some clear patterns emerge from results for 1989 given in Table 2.
18  
There was substantial variation in the degree of measured inequality in 
individual republics. The European Slavic republics of Ukraine and Belarus, 
and to a lesser extent Moldova, appear to have had less measured inequality 
 
18  The value of the available information depends on the publication from which it is taken.  
In the Family Budget Survey report for 1989 used by Atkinson and Micklewright, the bottom 
range of the data for five republics contained a third or more of the distribution in each case.  
The estimates in Table 2 are based on more detailed data, although the top decile still lies in an 
open top interval for several republics.  
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in 1989, with Gini coefficients at about the same level as that shown in 
Figure 5 for Hungary in 1987. 
 
Table 2:  Individual distribution of per capita household income in the Soviet 
republics, 1989 
 






   
Ukraine  0.23  2.7 
Belarus  0.23  2.7 
Moldova  0.25  3.1 




   
Latvia  0.26  3.0 
Lithuania  0.26  3.0 




   
Armenia  0.25  3.1 
Georgia  0.28  3.5 
Azerbaijan  0.31  4.1 
 
Central Asian republics 
 
   
Kyrgyzstan  0.27  3.5 
Turkmenistan  0.28  3.5 
Kazakhstan  0.28  3.5 
Uzbekistan  0.28  3.5 
Tajikistan  0.28  3.6 
 
Source: Estimation using data in Atkinson and Micklewright (1992, Table UI3) with 
the bottom range split between 0-50 and 50-75 rubles drawing on a table from 
Solsia'noe razvitie SSSR 1989, p119 (which by contrast combines higher ranges that 
are split in the source used by Atkinson and Micklewright).  The Pareto assumption 
was used to interpolate within intervals and in the top interval. 
 
The position of Ukraine and Belarus relative to the other republics reflects 
what was found earlier for earnings.  The five Central Asian countries, on the 
other hand, all had Ginis that were four or five per cent points higher than for 
these two Slavic republics, which is a sizeable difference. The Baltic and  
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Caucasian republics had varied results (Azerbaijan appears to have been the 
most unequal republic in the Union). The Gini shown for Russia is very 
similar to that for the USSR as a whole.
19 
We finish by considering for the 1980s the question that many scholars 
had addressed for earlier years – whether measured inequality of income was 
lower in pre-reform Eastern Europe than in the OECD countries (as then 
defined). Our ability to answer this question is greatly enhanced by the work 
on income inequality in the OECD countries by Atkinson et al., (1995).   
Their analysis, based on use of microdata sets in the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS), provides results under a variety of definitions – including the 
distribution by individuals with the per capita equivalence scale, the 
definition most commonly used in Eastern Europe. Table 3 compares the 
Gini coefficients given in Figure 5 with those for per capita income in 16 of 
the 24 countries that formed the OECD in the mid 1980s. 
The comparison does not of course provide “the” answer to the question of 
how the distribution of income differed between socialism and capitalism.  
Income inequality has varied over time in the West, as well as in the East, 
and comparisons made in a different period could give a different picture – as 
the earlier literature reviewed above suggests. Rather, the comparison should 
be seen as showing how the starting point for the Eastern European countries 
when entering the transition process compared with the situation at that time 
in the OECD area. 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the mid 1980s were just below the bottom 
of the OECD range. Poland and Russia were certainly above the most equal 
OECD country, Finland, but very much at the level of the other Nordic 
countries and Belgium. In all other OECD countries the Gini coefficient was 
higher than in the Eastern countries and in most cases by a sizeable margin.  
The means differ by 7 per cent points. The figure for the US was far higher 
than that for Russia, suggesting that the earlier comparisons of the US with 
the USSR for the 1970s by, for example, Bergson, were not a good guide to a 




19  The greater inequality in the Central Asian republics combined with their lower average 
incomes resulted in a far higher proportion of the population in this region below what had 
become by the end of the 1980s the conventional all-Union poverty line, a monthly income of 75 
rubles per capita.  The four core Central Asian republics all had a third or more of the population 
beneath this level, compared with only 5 per cent in Russia and 6 per cent in the Ukraine.  It 
might be thought that much larger household sizes coupled with a per capita adjustment of 
incomes has much to do with this but Marnie and Micklewright (1994) show that even with the 
distribution of household size present in Ukraine, the proportion of households below the 75 
ruble line in Uzbekistan, the largest Central Asian republic, would only have fallen in 1989 by a 





Table 3: Gini coefficients for the individual distribution of per capita income, 
Eastern Europe and OECD in the mid 1980s 
 
          0.20  Czechoslovakia 
0.21  Hungary 
Finland    0.22 
Sweden    0.24 
0.24  Russia 
0.25  Poland 
    Norway    0.25 
Belgium   0.25 
    Luxembourg  0.27 
    Germany  0.28 
    Netherlands  0.28 
    Canada    0.32 
    Italy     0.32 
    UK    0.32 
Australia  0.33 
France     0.33 
Portugal   0.33 
Ireland    0.36 
Switzerland  0.36 
USA    0.37 
     
    mean OECD   0.30  0.23  mean E. Europe  
   
 
Sources: Czechoslovakia (1985), Hungary (1982), Poland (1985): Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1992, Tables 5.1 and HI3); Russia (1985): estimates based on grouped 
data (nine ranges with top and bottom classes containing less than 10 per cent each) in 
Argumenty i fakty, no 20, 1990 (Pareto assumption used to interpolate within intervals 
and in the top interval); Figures for all OECD countries (1984-87) were estimated 
from the piece-wise linear (resulting in a slight under-estimate) Lorenz curves implied 
by the quantile shares given in Atkinson et al. (1995, Table 4.10), other than that for 
Portugal (1980/81) which was taken from (Rodrigues, 1993, Table 3). 
 
Suppose that as a result of the transition process, an Eastern European 
country with a pre-reform income share of the bottom quintile given by the 
average of the figures for the four countries in the table – 10.7 per cent – 
were to move to a distribution of income with a share of the bottom quintile 
given by the OECD average – 8.1 per cent. (These shares are taken from the 
same sources as the Gini coefficients.) Average real income would need to 
rise by one third for the income of the bottom quintile to merely stand still in 
absolute terms.  
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§ 2.5 Benefits in kind, subsidies and “fringe” benefits 
Was the distribution of households’ incomes in Eastern Europe under 
socialism a good guide to the distribution of their economic well-being? Can 
the data be interpreted in the same way as those from market economies 
when we take into account the existence of subsidised prices, rationing, non-
wage remuneration from work, and social benefits in kind? These questions 
are of interest not only for the historical comparison of income distribution in 
Eastern Europe under socialism with that in Western countries, but also for 
establishing the starting point for the transition process for the former 
socialist countries and hence for interpreting changes in measured income 
inequality in the 1990s and beyond. 
The problem facing the researcher was described by Bergson in the 
context of the USSR: 
“In the appraisal of equity, incomes that are compared, while expressed in monetary 
terms, are supposed to represent commensurate differences in real incomes.  Income, 
that is, should ideally be received in a monetary form, and be freely exchangeable for 
goods and services at established prices that are uniform for all households in any 
market area.” (Bergson, 1984, p1057). 
The implications of departures from this ideal have been of frequent 
concern to those writing on the distribution of income under socialism. But at 
the same time, it must be remembered that, as Bergson went on to put it, “the 
ideal is hardly realised anywhere”. To return to the comparison at the end of 
the previous section, the quintile shares in OECD countries would also need 
adjustment. The main difference in type between economic system, as 
opposed to degree, concerns the availability of goods, although even here 
there have been periods in Western economies where queues have developed, 
especially in the housing market. 
We begin with social benefits in kind, expenditure by the state on 
education and health. These are well developed in many market as well as 
socialist economies. At the end of the 1980s, expenditure by the state on 
education and health in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia 
represented between 12 and 16 per cent of household income (Milanovic, 
1995, Table 17-6). This compares to a range of 13 to 22 per cent (and a mean 
of 17 per cent) at the beginning of the 1980s in the seven OECD economies 
considered by Smeeding et al., (1993, Table 2). 
The typical analysis of the distributional impact of social benefits in kind 
proceeds by imputing a share of total state expenditure to each household and 
then summarises the impact across the distribution of income with the device 
of the concentration curve (or coefficient).  Putting aside the far from trivial 
question of how to value the state’s expenditure, at least two methodological 
issues arise.  
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First, the incidence of benefits in kind can be expected to be sensitive to 
the equivalence scale that is adopted when adjusting cash incomes for 
differences in households' needs. The per capita adjustment may be expected 
to put households with children further down the distribution than do other 
equivalence scales and, as a result, expenditure on education may appear 
more concentrated on the lower part of the distribution than would otherwise 
be the case. Milanovic (1995) for Eastern Europe and Smeeding et al., (1993) 
for OECD economies use different concepts of income and therefore their 
results cannot be directly compared: the former looks at incidence across the 
per capita income distribution while the latter considers incomes unadjusted 
for differences in household size. 
Second, the issue arises of how to attribute the expenditure to households, 
especially in the case of health. Official calculations in the UK impute health 
expenditure to households on the basis of information from other sources on 
average usage of medical services by age and sex. This could be seen as 
attributing to each household the insurance premium that would be paid in a 
system of private provision. By contrast, calculations made in Hungary in the 
1980s attributed health expenditure to households in survey data on the basis 
of their recorded usage of medical services in that same survey. This 
procedure is no doubt one reason why the Hungarian calculations display 
considerable dispersion of expenditure on social benefits  within income 
groups (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, Figure 6.5). 
The results of Milanovic (1995, Table 17-7) for Hungary, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia at the end of the 1980s all display negative 
concentration coefficients for education expenditure. Households in the lower 
part of the distribution receive more than their equal share of the benefit in 
kind, implying a strong equalizing effect.
20  This confirms the conclusions of 
earlier authors based on less detailed data.  Morrisson (1984), for example, 
cites evidence from Hungary for the 1970s which suggested that the inclusion 
of in-kind social benefits reduced the Gini coefficient for household incomes 
by two per cent points, as in the UK, the US and France.
21  Of course, as for 
cash incomes, the distribution of social benefits may change over time. (This 
issue is the focus of the analysis for the UK by Sefton, 1997.) 
The distributional impact of consumer price subsidies in pre-reform 
Eastern  Europe attracted a lot of attention. The size of the explicit 
consumption subsidies varied substantially across time and countries, as they 
 
20 It is notable, however, that the equalizing impact of education expenditure varies 
considerably with the level of education, expenditure on kindergarten and primary levels being 
much more concentrated on the lower part of the distribution than expenditure on secondary and 
vocational education. 
21  In the case of education, a similarity in the incidence East and West is consistent with the 
view that educational access under socialism was characterised by some of the same social class 
differences as that under capitalism (UNICEF, 1988).  
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do in market economies. The same is true of producer subsidies from which 
of course consumers often derived indirect benefit. In 1988, consumer 
subsidies represented about 5 per cent of GDP in Hungary and 10 per cent in 
Poland, figures which represent a potential for considerable leverage on 
inequality. This may be compared with a figure for subsidies in Britain as a 
per cent of net household income of less than 4 per cent in the mid-1970s and 
only one per cent in the early 1990s. 
Newbery (1995) reports on the work for Hungary in the mid-1970s by 
Szakolczai (1979), who argued that the then consumer price system had a 
poor redistributive effect; Newbery's conclusions using the same data are 
rather different: “production and consumption price distortions appear to 
have been remarkably effective at redistributing purchasing power” (pp.850-
1). Analyses for Poland and Hungary in the late 1980s revealed that poorer 
households received a less than equal share of total state expenditure on 
consumer subsidies – the concentration coefficients were positive (Atkinson 
and Micklewright, 1992, Milanovic, 1995). (Newbery points out that policy 
on the use of the price system as a redistributive tool may well have been 
consciously changed over time.) But the distribution was less unequal than 
that of cash incomes, implying an equalizing effect. (This is the situation 
where the concentration curve is between the Lorenz curve and the line of 
equality). The picture for individual subsidies, however, varied considerably. 
The valuation of subsidies in these analyses attributes state expenditure on 
the basis of observed consumption. (Newbery's methodology is an 
exception.) This contrasts with the appropriate theoretical concept, the 
equivalent variation of the price subsidy – the amount of income that would 
be required to keep the household at the same level of utility if the subsidy 
were to be abolished. But the standard illustration of the amount of the 
equivalent variation may need adjustment if subsidies go hand in hand with 
rationing, since a household’s observed expenditures may represent a mix of 
purchases at a lower subsidised price and a higher market price (Atkinson 
and Micklewright, 1992, Cornes, 1995). Nor should analysis focus only on 
the effect of explicit subsidies, ignoring the impact of other forms of price 
regulation and indirect tax. When the state owns all sales outlets and stands 
to bail-out any in financial trouble, the distinction between a price control 
and a price subsidy is blurred. As was put by the IMF and others, “in an 
economy where practically all commodity and factor prices are administered, 
the economic concepts of subsidies and taxes can become so broad as almost 
to lose their meaning, insofar as administered prices, wages, interest rates and 
the exchange rate all deviate from market-clearing values” (IMF et al., 1991, 
vol 1, p267). 
Housing was a good where subsidies v aried considerably across the 
socialist countries, and where state intervention has also been common in 
market economies.  In part this was linked to big variations in the pattern of  
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housing tenure. Bulgaria and Hungary, for example, were countries where 
owner-occupation was at a surprisingly high level by the end of the socialist 
period, although this does not imply that there were no housing subsidies for 
the households concerned – low interest mortgages from the state were a 
prominent feature. Three-quarters of the total housing stock at this time was 
occupied by owners in Hungary (Pudney, 1995) with the same figure found 
in urban areas in Bulgaria (Renaud, 1991). 
By contrast, the Soviet Union “maintained the dominant features of a 
centrally planned housing system for the longest time and in their most 
traditional forms” (IMF et al., 1991, vol 3, p317) and this was associated with 
substantial over-crowding as indicated by standard measures. The state 
owned two-thirds of the housing stock, and almost 90 per cent in large cities 
such as Moscow and St Petersburg (Buckley and Gurenko, 1997). Levels of 
rent in the 1980s were still largely determined by regulations from the 1920s.  
This was an extreme case, but state sector rents in Bulgaria and in 
Czechoslovakia dated from the 1960s (Renaud, 1991). 
In Hungary, subsidies to public-sector rents in the 1970s were estimated to 
have had a regressive impact, re-enforcing the picture of inequality obtained 
from cash incomes alone (Dániel, 1985) with the same true of all housing 
subsidies in 1989 (Dániel, 1997), including those to owner-occupiers (taking 
the value of subsidies as merely being the explicit expenditures in the state 
budget).
22 In the USSR, by contrast, analysis based on data on Soviet 
emigrées referring to urban households in the 1970s showed rent subsidies 
reducing inequality (Alexeev, 1990), the upper-bound of the market-clearing 
price being estimated as the average rent per square metre in the data for 
accommodation rented – illegally – from private individuals. 
The illicit sub-letting of public housing was a result of the housing 
shortages in the USSR. Places in the housing queues might be sold (again 
illicitly) with the result, according to Alexeev (1988), that the rent subsidy 
received by some high income households living in low-rent public housing 
represented in part a return on their investment. (Alexeev's results have 
subsequently been questioned by Buckley and Gurenko, 1998, who argue 
that income had little impact on housing demand at the end of the Soviet 
period.) 
The existence of “fringe” benefits – non-wage benefits from work – in pre-
reform Eastern Europe also received a lot of interest from writers concerned 
with inequality under socialism. Much of this focused on the rewards going 
to the nomenklatura  – superior housing, cars, holiday homes, access to 
imported goods. At the same time, non-cash benefits were far from being 
limited to the elite. For example, many enterprises provided nurseries and 
 
22  Dániel's earlier study attempted to allow for variations in quality as well as size of housing 
and employed a variety of different assumptions regarding valuation of the subsidy.  
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kindergartens that were highly subsidized, and, in some countries, housing.  
Enterprise provision of goods and services played an important role in a 
shortage economy. Where enterprises could obtain supplies of scarce 
consumer goods, through barter with other producers, they were able to give 
their workers access to goods that would otherwise have been unobtainable.  
Competition for scarce labour through cash wages that was restricted by 
centralised wage determination could occur instead through fringe benefits. 
In the West, substantial fringe benefits are available to top managers in the 
private sector. This aspect of remuneration from work in market economies 
has received much less attention than has the nomenklatura’s benefits in 
socialist economies. (See also Chapter 5 by Gottschalk and Smeeding.) 
Access to goods in short supply that could not be obtained elsewhere at 
any price seems an important difference in non-wage benefits under 
socialism. The existence of severe shortages in consumer goods clearly 
varied across country and time. For example, while reports of shortages of 
many consumer goods in the USSR in the 1970s abound, most consumption 
goods seem to have been in reasonable supply in Hungary in the late 1980s.  
The distributional implications of shortages depends on how these shortages 
are overcome. Effective rationing could be highly egalitarian and even if 
secondary markets develop “the tendency towards dampening of real relative 
to monetary income differentials should be mitigated” (Bergson, 1984, 
p.1058) albeit not eliminated. However, queues may be subject to 
manipulation – not all buyers are treated equally in the face of shortages as 
the discussion of public housing and of non-wage benefits indicates. 
Social benefits in kind, subsidies and fringe benefits certainly do alter the 
light in which income data under socialism should be viewed. The same is 
true for income data in market economies and in the case of social benefits in 
kind the light is probably altered in much the same way. Milanovic (1995) 
surmises that subsidies and fringe benefits broadly speaking cancel out in 
their impact on inequality under socialism, but that the latter dominate in 
market economies, with the result that the generally higher inequality of cash 
incomes in OECD economies understates the true comparison. The evidence 
is insufficient for any such general conclusion and the picture, as for cash 
incomes, undoubtedly varied across time and between countries. What is 
certainly true is that the impact on economic well-being of these factors is 
important and needs monitoring during the transition alongside changes in 
cash incomes. 
3.  Distribution in transition – theory 
No aspect of transition is tightly defined. We have seen above that there were 
significant differences in the starting points of the socialist economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe. There is also no unique endpoint for transition  
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and there are several Western models between which there is room for choice 
but all of which also represent moving targets. The transition itself could also 
take many different forms as  the experience of China and its regions 
demonstrate, as do the differences between Central Europe and the CIS. In 
this section we focus on several aspects of the transition relevant to the 
evolution of income distribution within the process itself. 
While there are several theoretical models of, for instance, the reallocation 
of labour between sectors in a liberalised  B but previously distorted  B 
economy (see, for example, Flemming, 1993) and between a state owned- 
and a private-sector characterised by distinct wage setting processes (see, for 
example, Aghion and Blanchard, 1994) they generate little inequality, except 
through unemployment, as labour is, essentially, assumed homogeneous.   
The first approach concentrates on the effects of the relative price changes 
associated with liberalisation which the latter ignore to concentrate on the 
effects of privatization, which may itself be endogeneous. According to the 
first approach instantaneous changes in relative product prices have 
implications for both factor prices and resource allocation – which can be 
expected to evolve together. This process could be influenced by a variety of 
interventions including employment subsidies or transitional protection. It is 
also likely that any tendency for the market clearing real wage for some 
category of labour to fall sharply would set up interactions with either the old 
or the new structure of income support possibly including formal or informal 
minimum (real) wages. 
Nearly all socialist economies (with the exception of  Czechoslovakia) 
embarked on the process of transition with a substantial monetary overhang.   
Thus where prices were liberalised they jumped, sometimes by factors of two 
or three. To the extent that monetary overhangs had accumulated from a flow 
of excess demand under controlled prices, there was a danger of continuing 
inflation and a need for stabilisation policies. Both of these interacted, as did 
the price jump itself, with income determination and income support 
processes. Several countries experimented with taxes on wage increases 
while apparently high ratios of pension or other benefits to wages were 
eroded by rapid inflation and lags in uprating benefits. 
Unemployment itself was a virtual novelty, challenging the administration 
to devise and implement procedures, criteria, and structures for delivering 
benefits. Socialist economies distributed many social services through places 
of work. With the prospect of declining participation, smaller enterprises and 
higher labour turnover, higher unemployment, as well as separation of the 
state from production, this becomes less appropriate. The transfer of these 
services from enterprises to, say, municipalities, is a major undertaking 
which is likely to impinge on the support and services supplied. The fiscal 
system also needs to be rebuilt with personal and corporate direct taxation as  
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well as the widespread adoption of Value Added Taxes often in incomplete 
forms (especially in the CIS). 
Finally, the process of administrative reform has a number of implications 
for income distribution.  It may be that the existence of abnormal quasi-rents 
would in any case bring protection racketeers into existence, certainly the 
incompleteness of liberalisation leaves underpaid bureaucrats in a position to 
make life difficult for new ventures unless they are paid off.  Many aspects of 
the modern market economy are typically regulated whether financially, 
environmentally or in land use, not to mention by tax officers. It is not clear 
that either the bureaucrats of the former branch ministries or the staff of the 
communist enforcement agencies were very promising material for these 
market regulatory roles. Assuming that new structures have to be developed, 
it is quite possible that the transition from central planning to market 
regulation will not be monotonic but will involve a period in which there is 
not much central effort at control while there remain sufficient vestiges of the 
old controls for corruption of the nomenklatura as well as the criminality of 
the so-called “mafia”. 
§ 3.1 Transitional adjustment and the distribution of 
earnings 
Some light on the consequences of rapid liberalisation of a heavily distorted 
centrally planned economy may be thrown by considering the effects of the 
rapid elimination of distortions in a (competitive) market economy. The 
parallel between the two situations is not very close for two reasons. First, the 
interventions under central planning included enterprise-specific ones with 
no obvious parallel in a market economy distorted by product-specific border 
or excise taxes or subsidies. Second, the distorted market economy has the 
market mechanisms and institutions in place to respond to changed price 
signals which may not be true of the formerly centrally planned economies. 
What would happen if major  distortions were eliminated overnight?  
Clearly, by assumption, relative prices would change radically at the 
enterprise level as well as at the consumer level. This will be true both of 
inputs, such as energy which was underpriced throughout COMECON, as 
well as of outputs. Thus value-added margins change sharply  – some 
widening while others narrow. Resources should shift from sectors in which 
margins have narrowed to those in which they have widened.  To the extent 
that this occurs, output at world prices will be increased thereby. 
A number of commentators (see, for example, McKinnon, 1991, Hughes 
and Hare, 1992) argued that significant sectors of the centrally planned 
economies were subtracting value at world prices. These would find 
themselves facing negative value-added margins on liberalisation. If they 
could not change their input/output ratios very quickly, or change their 
product design or quality, the cessation of such activities would also raise  
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world price GDP at the same time as releasing labour and other inputs for use 
elsewhere.  In the very short run the scope for redeploying that labour would 
depend on the technical nature and flexibility of the capital employed in the 
rest of the economy – particularly where value added margins were widest.  
If capital were flexible, labour could be redeployed promptly without its 
physical or, in an open economy, its value marginal product being seriously 
depressed.  In this case world price GDP could rise considerably and 
immediately, and with it, possibly, the market-clearing real wage (at the same 
prices). 
At the other, and arguably more realistic, extreme, opportunities for ex 
post substitution of labour for capital in the high value-added-margin sectors 
are virtually non-existent. Redeployed labour drives its marginal (physical) 
product down very rapidly before it has added much to world-price GDP. In 
this case the market-clearing real wage may fall sharply on liberalisation if 
labour is homogeneous and the market competitive, as in Figure 6A. If it is 
not, in the short run, there may be marked differentials unrelated to previous 
patterns and not strongly related to long-term steady state differentials under 
the new regime – see Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Impact of rapid liberalisation of a distorted market economy in 
which labour markets clear 
 
     
Capital/Labour Substitutability (ex post) 
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Note for Figure 6A:  
The bends in the functions A and B relate to capacity levels. (The steeper segments 
might be vertical at least over some ranges.) Up to that point additional employment 
is on older/inferior vintages of equipment – beyond it more labour is applied to that 
equipment. E1 is the initial (distorted) equilibrium. If distortions are removed (and 
other repercussions allowed for example in the exchange rate) one curve rises, as     
A1 ﬁ A2, and one falls, as B1 ﬁ B2. If the shifts are large enough for the two flatter 
segments no longer to intersect, the new equilibrium at E2 may be associated with a 
sharply reduced market clearing real wage (falling from W1 to W 2). The shaded area 














Note for Figure 6B: 
Removal of the distortion shifts A and B as in Figure 6A.  At E2 the wage W 2 is lower 
than the minimum wage Wmin. This gives rise to unemployment UA-UB.  An 
employment subsidy s, paid to employers and leaving employees' net real pay 
unchanged at W min, would raise output, reduce dole payments (at the rate b) and 




B.  Alternative effects of the subsidy on 
wages and earnings are considered in the text. 
 
There may of course exist some sectors, such as certain services or 
subsistence agriculture, in which the physical product of labour does not fall 
significantly as numbers rise. The living standard thus afforded would then 
play an important, albeit transitional, role in determining the distribution of 
income. If the relevant level was low relative to prevailing norms, whether 
dictated by social convention, formal minimum wages or a reservation wage 
driven by social security benefits, those not employed in organized sectors 
would join the ranks of the unemployed or possibly of those recorded as non-
participants – see Figure 6B. Apart from the value of their leisure or the fruits 
of gardening or other possibly “grey” activity, output falls in such cases 
relative to those in which subsistence sectors act as residual employers and a 
fortiori relative to those in which the market clearing real wage falls little if 
at all. The implications for income distribution depend crucially on the cash 
Figure 6B   
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income of the unemployed and non-participants. This might arise either 
under an explicit unemployment compensation scheme or under the terms of 
a more general social security safety net. 
As has been stressed above, the process of transition is a dynamic process 
of resource reallocation as well as a politico-economic process of reform, 
restructuring and institution-building, of which the former is the more 
amenable to economic analysis. At the new structure of liberalised relative 
prices, abnormal quasi-rents will accrue to the owners of some types of 
physical plant and machinery and also to the owners of certain types of 
human capital. These abnormal returns should induce the expansion of the 
supplies of the relevant types of capital thus bidding down their abnormal 
temporary rentals. 
If the labour market were to clear at a relatively low average real wage 
while world price GDP actually rose (by an amount represented by the 
shaded area in Figure 6A), there would clearly be a large increase in average 
profits and there might be a presumption that this shift in the factoral 
distribution of income would be favourable to investment. The investment 
would obviously tend to be concentrated in areas where returns were highest.   
How far this would extend to investment in any form of human capital 
would, as always, depend on the structure of the capital market and the 
appropriability of the returns. Low real earnings for most people would limit 
investment by households, while investment by profitable enterprises in 
training current or prospective employees might be deterred by their scope 
for migration to other employers. Limitation of investment in human capital 
to the children of workers themselves earning high quasi-rents would both 
slow down the process of adjustment and reinforce a cumulative deterioration 
in the distribution of income and wealth. 
§ 3.2 The scope for mitigating measures 
The effect of the changed structure of value added  margins on the 
distribution of earnings depends not only on the homogeneity or 
heterogeneity of labour skills but also on labour mobility between 
enterprises, industries and locations and also on the degree of competition in 
the market. Mobility was reduced in socialist states by the bureaucratic 
mechanisms for allocating accommodation  – often linked to employing 
enterprises. The intensity of labour market competition immediately after 
liberalisation is very hard to assess although crucial for certain types of 
possible policy interventions. 
Suppose that labour is homogeneous and labour market competition 
sufficiently intense to establish a single real wage.  Suppose further that there 
were significant sectors subtracting value (at world prices) under the old 
regime, that capital is sector specific and has (ex post) virtually fixed 
coefficients and that there is no subsistence service or agricultural sector but  
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a social security system which establishes a de facto minimum reservation 
real wage. This is clearly a recipe for post-liberalisation unemployment as 
well as a uniformly low real wage. A tax on profits used to subsidise 
employment would make some additional positive value added activities 
financially viable. It would thus raise employment and real (world price) 
GDP.  It would not raise wages since the factors determining the reservation 
wage are unchanged. As long as the subsidy was smaller than the social 
security payments previously made to the unemployed, net government 
revenue and/or investible profits would actually rise. 
The process can be illustrated by the following example: 
If employment is n, the minimum wage w, the subsidy s and the dole (unemployment 
benefit) b, an increase (ds) in the pre-existing rate of subsidy (s)  raises employment 
by dn, it raises output by dn times labour's marginal product (w-s) (its net cost to 
employers). Thus output rises by (w-s)dn and household income by (w-b)dn and the 
total of profits plus government revenue minus dole payments (as the intramarginal 
subsidy boosts profits), by (b-s)dn, which is positive as long as s<b<w. 
Although the remarkably favourable effects of a profits-tax-financed 
employment subsidy in the model are sensitive to the subsidy's effect on the 
take-home pay of the marginal employee, it does not require perfect 
competition. It is shown in Appendix A that while labour sharing in the quasi 
rents raised by the subsidy and an effective minimum wage linked to average 
earnings make more demanding the conditions for incremental subsidisation 
to be so beneficial, it is by no means impossible that these conditions should 
be met. 
In practice no transition economy implemented any such scheme, possibly 
because they were reluctant to take any risks with revenue at a time when 
raising revenue was seen as an essential element in a stabilisation package.  
In principle, if there were a single economy making the transition, many of 
the effects of a temporary employment subsidy could be achieved by a 
suitable structure of temporary protection. 
For many of their client states, the international financial institutions 
recommend the tariffication of inherited distortions which should then be 
phased out over a number of years B see John Williamson's “Washington 
Consensus” (Williamson, 1997). An exception was, however, made for the 
European transition economies for reasons that have never been clear. 
A programme of this sort would, however, have confronted several 
problems: 
 
-  that of converting the often opaque distortions of central planning and 
state trading into equivalent transparent border taxes; 
-  that of the initial enthusiasm of the central European transition economies 
for free trade (Messerlin, 1992);  
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-  the complication of there being several transition economies, trade 
between which should not have been distorted simply because each of 
them was unready for free trade with the West; 
-  the problem of making the timetable for phasing out the border taxes 
credible. 
The last problem might be mitigated in several ways. The countries could 
have agreed amongst themselves  in a trade treaty involving mutual 
commitments to phase out such transitional protection. Or its phasing out 
could have been a condition of World Bank or IMF assistance, or of access to 
EU markets under the Europe Agreements of the early 1990s. At that time 
the transition economies had very low formal tariffs. A declining ceiling 
could still have been imposed in a treaty and would have limited the scope 
for government concession to subsequent sectoral lobbying. The risk of such 
concession appears to have been underrated relative to those of an initially 
more protective regime initiated by government which might, by taking 
control and anticipating the lobbying pressure, have been better placed to 
resist it. 
§ 3.3 Wage controls and unemployment 
In practice, intervention in labour markets was directed more to the restraint 
of inflation than to the support of employment. Wages were in several 
countries subject to controls and in others to taxes (such as the Popiwek in 
Poland) related to the rate of increase of nominal wage rates, enterprise wage 
bills or of average earnings. The latter offered an incentive to retain relatively 
low paid staff on the books to restrain the growth of the average. In Russia 
the excess of the average earnings over some multiple of the minimum wage 
was taxed as profits. This has the effect of converting the profits tax into a 
tax on value added (profits plus wages) less a per capita allowance per 
employee. 
In Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union, enterprises kept 
some employees on the books at the minimum wage which might be only 10-
25 per cent of the average. There is some dispute as to how far this practice 
increased during the transition. It could be explained in several ways, in 
particular as reducing the taxation or as enabling those essentially 
unemployed to retain employment status which might be important to 
establish eligibility for a variety of social benefits (Standing, 1996). 
The emergence of open unemployment called for administrative 
innovations to establish and operate unemployment benefit offices and labour 
exchanges. While the benefits scheme was operated consistently and fairly 
restrictively in the Czech Republic, a significant part of the fluctuation of 
registered unemployment in Poland in 1991-3 has been attributed to 
variations in the application of eligibility standards. Effective replacement  
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rates were also liable to wide variations with fluctuations in inflation rates 
and operating procedures. (See, for example, Boeri, 1994 and 1995, Burda, 
1993 and 1995, Boeri and Edwards, 1998). One explanation offered initially 
for the continuing low level of open unemployment in Russia was that claims 
offices were so far apart as to be virtually inaccessible to many people (not 
only in rural areas). 
§ 3.4 Reforming delivery of social services and collection of 
taxes 
Some of these issues should be modified as the role of enterprises in the 
provision of social services, always greater in the former Soviet Union than 
in Central Europe, diminishes, to be replaced (in practice often only partially) 
by a clearer and more transparent provision by agencies of central or local 
government. This switch is not easily achieved as the transfer of funds and 
responsibilities is difficult to synchronise across competing enterprises in 
different regions and sectors, and the agencies concerned may be 
unenthusiastic about their new role. 
Of equal or greater import for the distribution of income is the direct tax 
system and also the system of indirect taxes and border taxes on consumer 
goods. On IMF and World Bank advice, Valued Added Taxation has been 
widely adopted in transition economies although the speed with which the 
reforms were claimed to have been introduced was such as to raise doubts as 
to the adequacy of the administrative machinery in fact in place. In Russia, in 
particular, there are grounds for doubting how quickly input tax was made 
recoverable as opposed to crude adjustments being made to cascading sales 
taxes. 
While under central planning there were features of the pricing system that 
could be interpreted as commodity taxes (possibly at enterprise-specific 
rates) personal income taxes were even less well developed, particularly in 
the Soviet Union.  Developing reporting, assessment and collection systems 
was not at all straightforward, as mentioned above. There are grounds for 
doubting the availability within the previous bureaucracy of personnel 
qualified for the collecting of taxes in a market economy. The scope for 
corruption is obvious and there is continuing evidence of failure to collect 
revenue in Russia and the rest of the CIS (EBRD, 1998). Such failures 
relative to approved budgets either lead to monetary financing and inflation 
or to public expenditure cuts often in the form of arrears of wages. As 
monetary controls have tightened, the problem of arrears and their impact, 





§ 3.5 Restitution 
Appropriability is not a problem only in the case of returns to human capital, 
considered at the end of Section 3.1. In many transition economies property 
rights were initially ill-defined and difficult to enforce. Moreover protection 
racketeers might cream off quasi-rents and, if monopolistic, mafiosi 
discourage the adjustment process as the scope for their activities would be 
smaller in any long term equilibrium. 
Another uncertainty about property rights in a number of Central European 
transition economies arose from the decision to return real property to its 
former owners (or their descendants).
23 Uncertainty as to who had the best 
claim was liable to deter any incumbent or claimant from improving or even 
maintaining the disputed assets.  In such cases the property was often vested 
in the incumbent with other claimants being made eligible for monetary 
compensation for their former expropriation. Interests in property by those 
who had, for instance, lent on its security were nowhere recognised. 
Given the alternative of distributing the value uniformly amongst citizens 
of what had, in the interim, become state property, it is clear that policies of 
restitution – often of estates to emigré aristocrats – do not make a positive 
contribution to the equality of distribution of income and wealth. Nor, being 
related only to expropriation and restitution to the living, is restitution 
focused on compensating the most acute victims of communism. 
One argument used to justify restitution was that the new regimes were 
pledged to respect private property and could demonstrate that commitment 
most effectively by returning to its previous owners, or their descendants, 
property taken by communists. This is not a very convincing argument. If the 
re-establishment of private property is a unique event, its security under the 
new regime is not enhanced by restitution which is only relevant to the future 
to the extent that further expropriation is a possibility. At the same time 
restitution to emigré aristocrats in particular might have had the effect of 
alienating people from the new regime. The fact that restitution appears not 
to have been unpopular suggests that people either did not recognise the 
value of the assets in question, or were so alienated from the socialist regime 
they saw as having been the owners of the assets that they did not realise that 
what was being given back was, or could have been, theirs. 
4.  Distribution in transition – evidence 
The annual Transition Report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) documents the changes in the Eastern European 
 
23  Restitution of land to indigenous peoples is an issue in several other regions such as the 
USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This usually relates to underdeveloped land in 




economies. Some of these changes are shown in Table 5 in the form of 
unweighted average values for groups of countries.  The first column gives 
the value in 1997 (the last year for which we have data on the distribution of 
earnings or incomes) of the EBRD’s “transition index”, which is intended to 
summarise countries’ cumulative progress from a planned to a market 
economy. The index takes into account a variety of dimensions of transition, 
including price liberalisation, privatization, re-structuring, competition 
policy, and reform of financial institutions. 
 
Table 5: Indicators of transition 
 


























share of GDP, 
1996 
(%) 
             
C.Europe  3.4  68  -1  34  10.6  46 
SE Europe  2.7  59  -30  179  17.3  37 
Baltics  3.2  67  -37  254  4.9  38 
Western CIS  2.4  46  -50  775  1.3  38 
Caucasus  2.4  50  -63  1926  3.1  19 
Central Asia  2.2  41  -42  758  1.6  24 
 
Note: Central Europe is the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; 
South East Europe is Albania, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia and Romania; The Baltics 
are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; Western CIS is Belarus, Moldova, Russia and 
Ukraine; Caucasus is Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; Central Asia is Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  The figures in the table are all 
unweighted averages of the data for each country. 
 
Sources: EBRD (1997, Table 2.1) for the transition index and private sector share, 
EBRD (1998, Table 3.1 and country annexes) for GDP change and government 
expenditure share, and UNICEF (1998, Annex Tables 10.9, and 10.12) for inflation 
and unemployment. 
 
The most advanced countries in 1997, in terms of the EBRD’s judgement 
of progress in the transition, were those in Central Europe and the Baltics.  
All the countries in these two groups had a value of the transition index 
greater than 3.0 and on average the private sector accounted for over two-
thirds of GDP. The four other groups of countries, three of which are formed 
by the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), had 
made less progress and retained higher public sector shares of output. The 
least progress of all had been made by the Central Asian republics, although 
the group average hides substantial variation (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan  
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had values of the transition index and private sector shares of output at about 
the average level for South East Europe, while Tajikistan and Turkmenistan 
were well behind).
24 
One expectation might be that inequality changes most in the countries 
which make the greatest progress away from the planned economy and where 
private activity accounts for the majority of output. To the extent that the 
state compressed the distribution of income pre-reform, surely a greater 
retreat of the state from the organization and control of economic activity 
will be associated with a larger rise in inequality? 
Other factors suggest that any simple relationship between the extent of 
economic reform and the change in inequality will not be found. First, the 
withdrawal from direct organization of economic activity by the state does 
not necessarily imply an indifference to the distributional implications of a 
more liberalised economy. Governments may try to re-distribute income 
from those gaining to those losing as a result of economic liberalisation. 
Electoral pressure, a new constraint to the state’s activity, may be one motive 
for this. A result of such re-distribution may be that inequality of gross 
earnings widens faster than the distribution of household incomes. 
Second, a continued dominant role for the state does not mean that the 
governments in the countries concerned will follow the same distributional 
objectives as before. The evidence reviewed earlier from the pre-reform 
period demonstrated that substantial changes in the distribution of earnings 
and household incomes took place during the socialist period as governments 
altered their distributional stance. Such alterations may continue, both among 
democratically-elected governments and among those that are a continuation 
of the previous regime. Table 5 shows that the slow reformers saw the largest 
falls in output over 1989-97. (The extent to which this represents cause and 
effect is of course the subject of debate.) Groups within the population may 
differ sharply in their political leverage and hence in their ability to protect 
their living standards from the implications of these changes. For example, 
workers in energy industries, where output is now traded on world market 
prices, may be able to secure increases in their wages relative to the average.  
The huge rates of inflation shown in Table 5, experienced in particular by the 
slower reformers, will have permitted sharp changes in relative wage rates 
and in the relationship between state transfers and wages.
25 State transfers are 
an important element of government expenditure, which the last column in 
 
24  There is substantial variation in some other groups too, notably the Western CIS where 
Russia was at this time much further advanced than the other three.  By 1998 Russia had slipped 
back on the transition index to the level of Ukraine, following government controls on the 
economy introduced during the financial crisis of that summer (EBRD, 1998, Chart 2.2). 
25  Inflation rates vary enormously within the groups of countries shown in Table 5 and the 
period chosen misses, for example, the hyper-inflation in Poland in 1990.  
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the table shows to vary substantially in terms of the share of GDP, and in 
particular to be much lower in the Caucasus and Central Asia than elsewhere. 
A further complication is that the evidence on distributional changes refers 
to measured income inequality, as in the pre-reform period. Transition has 
seen a sharp reduction in consumer price subsidies, and on the evidence of 
the pre-reform period this will have had a regressive impact. Measured 
changes in the distribution of household incomes may provide a lower bound 
on changes in the distribution of economic welfare, and the importance of 
this may well vary across the groups of countries identified in Table 5, fast 
reformers cutting out subsidies more quickly. We consider some evidence on 
the distributional impact of remaining subsidies at the end of the section. 
As in the discussion of the pre-reform period, we look first at evidence on 
changes in the distribution of earnings, before turning to household incomes.  
Throughout this discussion we consider only changes in relative incomes.  
The comparison of income growth with change in income inequality of 
course underlies m uch of the discussion of the change from planned to 
market economy, but it is too early to assess the consequences of incomplete 
transitions. (By 1997, measured output in only one country, Poland, exceeded 
the level achieved in 1989.)  An investigation of this issue remains a task for 
the future. 
§ 4.1 Data sources in transition 
Transition towards a market economy and, in many cases, to a more open 
society has important consequences for available sources of distributional 
data and the interpretation to be put on them. The household budget survey of 
the former Socialist Republic of Salubria may continue in the now 
democratic, mixed-economy, Salubrian state – but this does not mean that the 
data are collected as before or that they can be interpreted in the same light.  
Or the Salubrian statistical office may abandon its previous survey 
methodology completely - the changes affect the use of the available data to 
judge the impact of transition on income inequality. 
Some issues will be obvious from our earlier discussion of data from the 
pre-reform period, including the comparison made with sources in Western 
countries. Transition has seen sharp increases in the share of private activity, 
poorly covered by many pre-reform surveys. There are more small firms, 
which a re often excluded from employer earnings enquiries; there are more 
self-employed, a group often not included in pre-reform budget surveys and 
whose income is hard to measure if now included. Unemployment has made 
household incomes more variable over the year with the result that annual 
income is harder to measure than before. Systems of social security benefits 
have become more complex, including increased use of means-testing, and as 
a result are more difficult to survey. The introduction of personal income tax 
may provide a disincentive to accurately report incomes to household  
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surveys.  And a change in the relationship between the citizen and the state 
may of itself change willingness to co-operate with enquires by the state 
statistical office. 
These changes should have reduced the quality of data that are collected.  
On the other hand, price liberalisation means that the data that do exist 
should more accurately represent the distribution of economic welfare than 
before, although this in turn reduces comparability with the pre-reform 
period. In each case the changes reflect the differences between one 
economic and political system and another. 
Other changes are less obvious and are a feature of the  process of 
transition. They may again be expected to reduce the quality of the data or 
their comparability with those from earlier years. Reductions in public 
expenditure as output has fallen will have cut statistical office budgets, which 
may reduce the quality of the work undertaken and the regularity with which 
data are collected. A common problem has been the loss of staff, lured away 
by higher private sector wages.  Rampant inflation, which Table 5 shows has 
occurred especially (but not only) in parts of the former Soviet Union, results 
in various problems for surveying. Data on annual incomes may be rendered 
meaningless.
26 The phenomenon of arrears in wage payments and social 
security benefits, again common in the former Soviet Union, is an associated 
problem. Arrears represent a command over resources for the individual to 
whom they are owed but inflation greatly reduces their value. The 
introduction of progressive income tax may be coupled with a grossing-up of 
“first economy” earnings so as to leave net earnings unchanged, leading to a 
one-off spurious rise in earnings inequality. 
The importance of these problems varies from country to country, as the 
examples of inflation and wage arrears illustrate. The same is true of the 
ability of statistical offices to cope with the challenges faced. The offices in 
many of the republics of the former Soviet Union have been in a particularly 
weak position, exacerbating the problems stemming from a poor inheritance 
of surveying tradition. Separate offices in each republic existed prior to the 
break-up of the Union but they had little autonomy. The Family Budget 
Survey seems to have continued much as before in many republics during the 
first half of the 1990s, becoming an even less suitable source for the study of 
income distribution – its multiple weaknesses exposed ever more severely by 
the change in economic system.
27 
 
26  If surveying is continuous through the year and no adjustment is made of the monthly 
figures, the annual amounts will be dominated by the data for the last quarter. 
27  For example, the part of the survey relating to Uzbekistan was laudably expanded by the 
Republic’s statistical office from 3,000 to 4,250 households in 1992 with the aim of improving 
the representativity of the quotas relating to each sector of the economy.  However, the quotas 




To set against this there have been some positive developments in sources, 
often as a result of technical assistance from international organizations.  The 
World Bank has been instrumental in developing completely new surveys in 
several former Soviet republics, using conventional methods of sample 
design and survey conduct, based on its Living Standard Measurement Study 
(LSMS) methodology (Oliver, 1997). A prominent example is the Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), conducted by the University of 
North Carolina (Mroz et al., 1997)  – a survey of several thousand 
households, of which seven rounds had been held by the end of 1996 (with 
the first in 1992).
28 Other examples include surveys in Azerbaijan (1995), 
Kazakhstan (1996), Kyrgyzstan (1993), and Ukraine (1995). 
The new data have enabled some important insights, but these surveys did 
not necessarily result in quick improvements in the capacity of statistical 
offices in the countries concerned (Falkingham and Micklewright, 1997).
29  
(The main purpose of several of the surveys was to collect data for World 
Bank staff to carry out one-off assessments of poverty and of targeting of 
state spending.) However, clear progress has been made in some cases, for 
example the new official budget surveys in Belarus, Latvia and Lithuania 
(Martini et al., 1996, Lapins and Vaskis, 1996, Sniukstiene et al., 1996) and 
the LSMS-type survey carried out by the Kyrgyz statistical office in 1996 
(National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1997). Even in 
Russia, where resistance to change appears to have been strong, revisions 
started to be made during 1996 to the sample design of the Family Budget 
Survey (Frolova, 1998). 
The more advanced Eastern European statistical offices were better placed 
to react quickly to some of the problems of data collection posed by the 
change of economic system. The Hungarian statistical office began to include 
the self-employed in the country’s budget survey in 1989; in 1992 the Polish 
statistical office extended the sample of its budget survey to households of 
the non-agricultural self-employed (the agricultural self-employed had 
already been included)  – the survey in 1991 had excluded from coverage 
about 15 per cent of all private households (Kordos, 1996, p.1128). The same 
household type was included in the Czech and Slovak budget surveys in 
1993. This was a negligible group in 1989 but by 1992 it represented 6 per 
cent of households in the Czech Republic and 4 per cent in Slovakia (Garner, 
 
28  The availability of the RLMS microdata through the internet (the data may be downloaded 
from www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms) provides a striking contrast with the situation regarding data in the 
Soviet period. 
29  Analyses of distributional issues with surveys sponsored by the World Bank in former 
Soviet republics include Mroz and Popkin (1995), Newell and Reilly (1996), Ackland and 
Falkingham (1997), Falkingham (1997), Commander et al., (1999) and the papers in Klugman 
(1997).  An example using a survey from outside the former USSR is the work on Albania by 
Alderman (1998).  
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1998, p.296).  Users of Czech or Slovak budget survey data, or of Polish 
data, from the early 1990s are therefore faced with a changing sample 
coverage – an increasingly important group (likely to have disproportionately 
high or low incomes) is first excluded and then included in the survey.
30 
Coverage and representativeness have also changed due to varying survey 
response rates, and a fall in the willingness of households to participate in 
official surveys seems to have been characteristic of the transition. For 
example, response to the Czech microcensus fell 20 per cent points between 
1989 and 1997, from 96 per cent to 76 per cent (VeèernRk, 1998). In 
Hungary, response to the budget survey fell from an average of 78 per cent in 
the three surveys in 1983-87 to 61 per cent in the annual surveys in 1993-95, 
with a figure of only 33 per cent achieved during the latter period in the 
capital, Budapest.
31  Frolova (1998) reports declining response to the Family 
Budget Survey in Russia.
32 
The changing nature of the data, and of the interpretation that should be 
put on them, make it difficult to arrive at simple conclusions from the 
available  evidence on the impact of transition on income distribution.  As 
was put by the 1996  World Development Report, devoted to transition, 
“comparisons across countries and over time are very approximate” (World 
Bank, 1996, p.67). 
The World Development Report went on to argue that “some clear patterns 
emerge … inequality has risen throughout the region”. In the case of the 
Czech Republic, the evidence in the Report recorded a rise in the Gini 
coefficient of per capita household income of about seven per cent points 
between 1988 and 1993 B a sizeable change. The sources were not given, but 
investigation reveals that the data from the two years came from very 
different surveys. The data for 1988 refer to information on annual income, 
collected in the official microcensus which covered some 60,000 households 
(the source we used in Figure 5). Those for 1993 relate to income in January 
of that year, collected through a survey with a quota sample of some 1,700 
 
30  Garner reports that the household types covered by the Czech and Slovak budget surveys 
(both quota samples) represented about 95 per cent of all households in each republic in 1989, 
but that by 1992 the figures had dropped to 90 per cent and 84 per cent (1998, p.296).  
31  We are grateful to Judith Lakatos of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office for this 
information.  It should be noted that the shortfall in response in Hungary and the other countries 
we refer to is not just due to refusal to participate.  For example, Lapins and Vaskis (1996) point 
to the deficiencies in available sampling frames in the early transition period as a major factor in 
the 30 per cent non-reponse rate to the new Latvian budget survey. 
32  By contrast, response to the Polish budget survey has increased sharply, apparently as a 
result of a reduction in the period for which households are asked to participate from three 
months to one month (Kordos, 1996, Tables 1 and 2).  
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adults, conducted by the Institute of Sociology.
33 Like was n ot being 
compared with like (we show below the consequence). 
Even when the sources concerned appear to be the same, there are good 
reasons for being cautious about accepting the evidence at face value. The 
uncertainties that surround the data make particularly valuable evidence on 
changes over time from different sources. Do the changes in earnings 
inequality recorded in a country’s employer enquiry correspond with those 
suggested by the budget survey or some other source? Do independent 
surveys of household incomes corroborate the patterns in official sources?  
We try in what follows to collect evidence of this type so that a more robust 
picture of changes can be obtained. 
Where possible, we compare series from before and after the end of the 
period of the planned economy, so as to avoid conclusions that hinge unduly 
on comparisons made for single years. The data series from the transition 
period are, of course, rather short, and by definition reflect an unfinished 
process  – but it is that process which is of most interest, rather than a 
particular point along the way. As we noted at the start of the chapter, the 
study of transition is not one of comparing equilibria before and after the end 
of socialism. 
§ 4.2 The distribution of earnings in transition 
How has the size distribution of earnings changed in economies in transition?  
Labour markets in Central and South-Eastern Europe have been characterised 
by substantial unemployment, sectoral shifts in employment and rapid 
growth in the private sector, and rising returns to education and skill (Allison 
and Ringold, 1996, and Rutkowski, 1996a). 
The picture in many of the republics of the former Soviet Union is rather 
different, reflecting in part their slower pace of economic liberalisation. One 
important difference has been the lower rates of open unemployment in the 
first half of the 1990s, with adjustment in the labour market to the large falls 
in output and changes in terms of trade being largely in terms of price rather 
than quantity – at least in terms of formal shedding of labour. This difference 
is reflected in the registered unemployment rates shown in Table 5, although 
these data undoubtedly understate the true level of unemployment in many 
former Soviet republics, where the incentive to register as unemployed has 
 
33   The Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences conducted a series of such surveys 
of “Economic Expectations and Attitudes” from 1991.  The surveys are an important initiative 
but their author, Jiri VeèernRk, has been careful to note that the income questions are not as 
detailed as in the microcensus. (Respondents to the EEA surveys were asked five simple 
questions about their own income and that of all other household members.) And he comments 
“it is clear that the quality of our surveys’ data could not be the same as with statistical surveys.  
Results could serve as preliminary information only” (VeèernRk, 1993, p.32). Results from the 
EEA surveys and other Czech sources, covering a range of issues, are given in (VeèernRk, 1996).  
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often been low. For example, unemployment in Russia as measured by the 
standard ILO/OECD criteria of search and availability for work was nearly 5 
per cent in late 1992 and over 9 per cent by the end of 1995, compared to less 
than 1 per cent and little more than 3 per cent respectively according to the 
official register.
34 
We start with Central Europe. In the case of former Czechoslovakia, we 
have data from the transition period only for the Czech Republic. A series of 
data for the distribution of earnings in Slovakia appears not to exist (or at 
least is not readily available) and this is particularly unfortunate given the 
natural interest in the different experiences of the two halves of the former 
federation after their separation in 1992.
35 (We saw  earlier that the 
distribution of earnings in the two republics was very similar at the end of the 
1980s.) 
Figure 7 shows for 1980-97 the decile ratio, and the ratios of the top and 
bottom deciles to the median, for the distribution of monthly gross earnings 
for men and women taken together (full-time workers). The estimates for the 
1980s are the same as those in Figure 1 (except in the case of the Czech 
Republic although the source here is the same, the earlier results referring to 
all of Czechoslovakia) and are included so that changes during the 1990s can 
be viewed in relation to any that occurred in the previous decade. (The reader 
should note that the scale in this and other graphs covering the 1990s is not 
necessarily the same as in those earlier in the chapter for the socialist period 
alone.) 
The data for the 1990s are a continuation of the same series of employer 
enquiries from the pre-reform period, and in this sense there is comparability 
across the two decades. However, the coverage of the enquiries and the 
definitions of the included earnings may have changed during transition. We 
noted earlier that the introduction of progressive personal income taxation 
will lead to a break in the series if accompanied by grossing-up of earnings to 
leave net pay unchanged. In Hungary this occurred in 1988 which is why the 
figure for this year was not included in Figure 1.  
 
34  The figures on ILO/OECD basis are from the labour force survey for 1992Q4 and 
1995Q4, given in the OECD CCET labour market database. 
35  Rutkowski (1996a, p54) gives information on the distribution of earnings in Slovakia in 
1993 but the data come from a labour force survey and are not therefore comparable in nature 
with those from an employer earnings enquiry given for 1989 (Jan Rutkowski pointed out to us 






Source: See Figure 1 and Appendix B (except 1988 for Hungary, which is from 
Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, table HE1). 
 
 
Figure 7: Earnings distribution for full-time workers: Czech Republic, 












































The same occurred in Poland in 1992.
36 The extent to which measured 
earnings inequality rose as a result of the changes is difficult to judge and we 
have dealt with the problem by merely indicating in the diagram a break in 
the series (the effect in Hungary appears to be much larger than in Poland).  
In all three countries there have been growing exclusions from coverage, the 
importance of which are again hard to gauge. The data for the enquiries in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic exclude firms with less than 50 and 25 
employees respectively. The Polish enquiry excludes private sector firms 
with less than 6 employees. 
The decile ratio for Hungary shows a steady increase from 1988, reaching 
4.17 in 1997. This continues a trend that was already present over 1980-86 
but at a rate that is over two and a half times faster. To help put this into 
perspective, the average annual increase in Hungary during 1980-86 was the 
same as in Britain during 1980-90, a period in which inequality is considered 
to have risen quite rapidly (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, Table BE1).  
By this yardstick the widening of the distribution in Hungary over the 1990s 
was indeed fast.  A look at the lower parts of the diagram show that the rise 
in inequality in Hungary was driven more or less equally by changes at either 
end of the distribution. 
The story in Poland for the 1990s is similar. The decile ratio rises rapidly 
at much the same annual rate as in Hungary (again driven by changes at 
either end of the distribution), although it was only in 1994 that its value 
exceeded those in 1976-78 shown in Figure 1. 
The figures for the Czech Republic, however, show much greater variation 
and the changes at each end of the distribution during the 1990s are more 
complicated. The decile ratio for 1996-97 was below that in 1993-95. We 
have not established the reasons for the changes but the overall pattern shows 
the danger of focusing on individual years during the transition period – just 
as earlier we noted the danger of taking a single year when studying the 
socialist period. 
The exclusion from the data of persons working for small firms may affect 
both the level of measured earnings inequality at any one time and its speed 
of change.  In the case of Hungary, the employer enquiry does in fact include 
these persons, although they are kept separate by the statistical office in the 
analysis.  We have the data for 1993 and the number of employees concerned 
was considerable  – over 20 per cent of all full-time workers were in firms 
with less than 50 workers. Not surprisingly, their earnings differ from those 
of employees of larger firms and when we include these individuals in the 
 
36  Personal income tax was introduced in the Czech Republic in 1993 but in a manner that 
apparently led to no effect on measured earnings inequality (we are grateful to Jiri VeèernRk for 
this information).  Information on coverage of the Czech and Polish enquiries is taken from 
VeèernRk (1995) and Rutkowski (1996b).  
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calculations the decile ratio rises from 3.70 to 4.01. It seems a safe bet that 
the ratio including the smaller firms’ workers in 1997 would be at least 4.5. 
In all three countries, there is also information from household survey data 
on the distribution of earnings. Pudney (1994a, 1994b) compares results from 
the same employer enquiry data for 1988-92 used in Figure 7 (for firms with 
more than 50 employees) with those based on budget surveys for 1989 and 
1991. He finds that the two sources tell the same story for the change in 
inequality, but that the level is substantially higher in the budget survey 
data.
37  By contrast, VeèernRk (1995) finds a notably larger rise in earnings 
inequality between 1988 and 1992 in Microcensus data for the Czech 
Republic than is recorded in the employer enquiry used in Figure 7. And 
labour force survey data for Poland show very little change in the dispersion 
of monthly earnings over 1992-96 (Newell and Socha, 1998); the decile ratio 
was 2.69 at both the beginning and end of the period, compared to a rise from 
2.91 to 3.48 in the employer data in Figure 7. All these results again show the 
danger in taking the estimates from one set of data as being definitive. 
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are countries that were well 
advanced on the process of economic reform by the mid-1990s. The changes 
in Hungary began long before 1989; Poland always had a substantial private 
sector; the Czech Republic had by 1995 the largest private sector share of 
GDP of any economy in transition. Russia, by contrast, has been a slower 
reformer (although faster than several others). How did measured earnings 
inequality change in this country where the transition process had further to 
go by the late 1990s? Figure 8 shows how the decile ratio and the top and 
bottom deciles relative to the median evolved in Russia over 1981-1997, 
again based on data on monthly earnings for full-time workers from 
employer earnings enquiries (the same source as in Figure 1 for the USSR). 
 
37  A further source is the annual panel survey of 2,000 households started by the research 
institute, TARKI, in 1992.  PJter Galasi kindly calculated for us the decile ratio of monthly 
earnings of full-time employees in the TARKI panel who worked a full month (the same 
definition of sample and time period to that in the employer enquiry data). The TARKI data refer 
to net earnings and not surprisingly in view of deductions due to a progressive income tax, these 
data show a substantially lower level of earnings dispersion than do the employer enquiry data 
that refer to gross amounts (although if an estimate of the tax paid by each individual is added 
back into the data, a substantially higher decile ratio for gross earnings is found).  The change in 
the decile ratio showed by the TARKI panel is more erratic than in the employer enquiry but 
broadly speaking moves up at the same speed.  
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Figure 8: Earnings distribution for full-time workers: Russia and Ukraine, 
1981-1997 
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The changes in measured earnings inequality in these data are 
extraordinary, dwarfing those recorded for Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
Republic. In the last year of the Soviet Union, 1991, the data for Russia show 
a jump in the decile ratio from 3.4 to 4.3, restoring it to the level shown by 
Figure 1 for the end of the 1950s – or about that for Hungary in 1997. In 
1992, the first year of price liberalisation, the decile ratio in Russia leaps to 
over 8, and, incredibly, almost doubles again the next year to over 15 – off 
the top of our graph – before falling back to about 9 or 10 in 1994-97, a level 
far above that in any OECD country.
38  The bottom part of Figure 8 shows 
that the rise in inequality has been driven, broadly speaking, by similar 
changes at both ends of the distribution, as in the Central European countries. 
The bottom decile halved relative to the median over 1989-97 while the top 
decile rose by 60 per cent. Put another way, the fall in the bottom decile 
would have been sufficient alone to push the decile ratio to 6.5, while the rise 
in the top decile alone would have driven it up to 5.3. What has been the 
cause of this dramatic widening of the Russian earnings distribution? The 
changes seem almost to defy credibility. 
The first issue to consider is indeed whether the rise in dispersion recorded 
in these data is spurious in some sense. Is it found in other data sets that 
provide an alternative source of information to the official employer enquiry?  
One might expect the Russian enquiry to have deteriorated in quality and 
representativeness more than those in the Central European countries 
considered earlier. (The Russian enquiry is meant to cover both state and 
private employers but we have no knowledge of its coverage in practice 
during the 1990s.)  Or is the definition of “full-time” work meaningful in any 
Russian data set from this period?  Are there large numbers of persons in the 
data who are officially employed full-time but who do little or no work, and 
who are paid accordingly? What is the treatment in the data of wage arrears, 
which grew notably in importance in Russia in the first half of the 1990s? 
We have no other data for Russia that span both the break-up of the USSR 
and the liberalisation of prices in 1992. However, the Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS), a household survey referred to in our earlier 
discussion of sources, provides information from the second half of 1992 
onwards, each round of the survey containing several thousand employees 
who should form a r epresentative sample of all workers. Table 6 gives 
quantile ratios from three rounds of RLMS for earnings paid in the previous 
month (if positive) in the respondent's main job. These show a level of 
inequality of a similar order of magnitude to those in the employer enquiry, 
 
38  In each year both top and bottom deciles lie in closed intervals containing only a few per 
cent of the distribution, so the results cannot be very sensitive to the method of interpolation.  
The only exception is in 1997 when the top decile lies in an open interval containing 14 per cent 
of the distribution.  
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especially for 1994-95 when the ratios of top and bottom deciles to the 
median, as well as the decile ratio, correspond quite well in the two sources. 
 
Table 6:  Quantile ratios of monthly earnings for full-time workers in the 
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) 
 
  RLMS wave      Q90/Q10  Q90/Q50  Q10/Q50 
 
1992   (round 1 – Jul/Sept)    6.3  2.50  0.40 
1994   (round 5 – Nov/Dec)    9.8  2.95  0.30 
1995   (round 6 – Oct/Nov)    9.2  2.75  0.30 
 
 
Note: Interviewing in each round of RLMS is conducted over two or more months 
and respondents are asked the earnings paid in the previous month. Before calculating 
the quantiles, in each case we have adjusted the data for changes in average earnings 
between the months covered. 
 
Source: Calculations were made from microdata.  Sample size was 5,386 in 1992, 
2,505 in 1995, and 2,201 in 1995. We restricted the samples to those working as an 
employee in their main job, with earnings paid in the last month, and with hours 
worked in the last month of 140 hours or more. 
 
The results in Figure 8 for the mid-1990s therefore appear to be repeated 
in a quite different data set.  But do either the employer enquiry or the RLMS 
really refer to full-time earnings? Russian enterprises often sought to 
minimise lay-offs during the period in question, putting employees on leave 
with no or minimal pay or on short-time work. By mid 1994, 22 per cent of 
the labour force were apparently in one of these categories (Standing, 1996, 
p.82). Those on short-time work (which seems to have been much the more 
common of the two) probably enter the employer enquiry data (we have no 
information about those on leave), implying that the dispersion shown in 
Figure 8 is biased upwards. 
On the other hand, the results from the RLMS in Table 6 are restricted to 
individuals who reported working at least 140 hours in the previous month in 
the job in question, and should therefore be largely free of this problem. (It is 
of course possible that some respondents are not actually working the hours 
that they report.) It should also be remembered that the rise in dispersion 
shown in Figure 8 is not just on account of changes at the bottom of the 
distribution – there was a sharp increase in inequality at the top as well. 
The issue of wage arrears further complicates matters, and underlines the 
difference between an employer enquiry and a survey of employees. RLMS 
data show that by late 1996, a half of all working-age adults were owed 
money by their primary employer, with “these delinquent payments being 
equal, on average, to one month's expenditures for an average household” 
(Mroz et al., 1997, p14). Arrears are said to be the main cause for the rise in  
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the number of respondents reporting employment but no earnings for the 
previous month, from 6 per cent of the labour force in 1992 to 21 per cent in 
1996. The employer earnings enquiry seems to ignore the distinction between 
arrears and payment – the figures reported to the statistical office apparently 
include both earnings actually paid and those still owed to workers. The 
RLMS figures refer to payments received, but the data do not allow the 
identification of either partial payments made in the last month or payments 
that included arrears from earlier pay-periods. Both of these would lead to 
upward bias in the recorded dispersion. 
Notwithstanding all these difficulties, it is difficult to dismiss the levels of 
recorded earnings dispersion in Russia in the mid-1990s as a mere aberration 
of the data. A substantial part of the inequality in full-time earnings recorded 
in the available data for Russia seems to be genuine, especially when viewed 
in the light of accounts of wage determination during the transition. 
Mikhalev and Bjorksten (1995) and Standing (1996) both emphasize the 
contrasts between wage setting in the “budgetary” sector (enterprises and 
institutions paid from the state budget), in state-owned enterprises, and in the 
private sector, composed partly of privatized former state enterprises and 
partly of new private firms. Centralised wage setting remained only in the 
budgetary sector, where wage indexation was carried out by periodic 
increases in the minimum wage to which the wage tariff scale was fixed. The 
minimum wage was changed twice in 1992, three times in 1993, but only 
once in 1994.  Substantial erosion of wages in the budgetary sector relative to 
other sectors occurred both between these changes and over the period 1991-
94 as a whole, when the minimum wage dropped from about 25 per cent to 8 
per cent of the average wage. Few workers were actually paid at the level of 
the minimum pre-transition – the importance of the minimum wage in Russia 
comes from its link with other wage rates and social security benefits.
39 
State-owned enterprises gained financial autonomy in 1992 with managers 
free to set wages as desired, subject to some limited union influence (see also 
Commander et al., 1995). And by mid-1994 medium or large-sized 
enterprises employing 85 per cent of the industrial labour force had been 
privatized (Standing, 1996, p.11). The effect on wages depended  on the 
nature of each enterprise’s business – workers in enterprises operating as 
natural monopolies, notably in energy extraction and supply, saw big rises in 
relative wages. Wages in light manufacturing, hit by a sharp reduction in 
 
39  The link with state transfers is a feature in common with other transition countries, 
including several in Central Europe.  Standing and Vaughan-Whitehead (1995) argue that it has 
led to a reduction in the importance of the minimum wage in the region’s labour markets as 
governments have used minimum wage policy as a way of controlling expenditure on state 
transfers.  (The minimum wage in Hungary, for example, declined from 65 per cent of the 
average wage in 1989 to 35 per cent by mid 1994.)  
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demand for output, fell relative to others. The private sector, important in 
trade and financial services, emerged as the sector with the highest average 
wages. Survey data for different months in the first half of 1994 record 
average private sector wages consistently about double those in state-owned 
enterprises (Mikhalev and Bjorksten, 1995, Table 15). Summarising the 
situation, Standing argues that “the wage system that emerged in the early 
and mid-1990s could be characterised as one of the most flexible 
conceivable” (1996,  p.113) and reports evidence from employer surveys of 
increasing determination of wages according to individual performance.
40  
(See also Layard and Richter, 1995.) 
Was the increase in Russian earnings dispersion associated with much 
movement by different groups around the distribution, or are those doing 
well before and after 1991 the same people? The evidence is mixed. Workers 
in energy extraction and supply did relatively well after 1991 but also 
benefited from the bias towards the “productive” sector pre-reform.  
Standing, however, argues that inter-industry wage differentials were 
changing by the mid-1990s (1996, p.143). There seems agreement about 
some groups. Mikhalev and Bjorksten report that “a striking development is 
that professionals and engineers who have traditionally been underpaid in 
Russia have lost more ground in recent years” (1995, p.22), noting that many 
are found in the budgetary sector. 
By way of comparison with Russia we include in Figure 8 what is more 
limited data for Ukraine, the second most populous former Soviet republic. 
Ukraine provides a comparator which has been one of the slowest reformers 
among all the former socialist countries and where macroeconomic collapse 
has been even deeper than in Russia. The differences in the figures for 1992 
between Russia and Ukraine are striking. From then on dispersion rises 
sharply in Ukraine although we are only able to track adequately the changes 
from year to year at the bottom of the distribution.
41 Both bottom and top 
decile stay somewhat closer to the median than in Russia (especially the top 
decile) but the decile ratio by 1996 is 5.7, well above the level for the Central 
European countries in Figure 7. (We have no information about the quality or 
coverage of the Ukraine data during the 1990s, which, like those from the 
1980s, come from an employer enquiry.) 
How do the levels of earnings inequality in the 1990s in the countries we 
have considered compare with those in other industrialised countries? The 
 
40  He also argues that the excess-wage tax applied to enterprises in Russia in the wake of 
price liberalisation provided an incentive for managers to retain very low-paid employees so as 
to reduce the average wage, a possibility we noted in Section 3. 
41  We do not estimate the top decile in 1991, 1994 or 1995 since in these years they lie in an 




1997 values of the decile ratio from the employer enquiries in our five 
transition countries were (to one decimal place): 
 
  Czech Republic       3.0 
  Poland         3.5 
  Hungary       4.2 
  Ukraine (1996)       5.8 
  Russia      10.4 
The figures for Ukraine and, especially, Russia are well in excess of those 
found in OECD countries, although for these two cases there is considerable 
uncertainty about what the data actually measure. Looking back at Figure 3, 
the level in Hungary is at about that in Canada or the US and well above 
those in Western Europe (and we argued that the true value in Hungary was 
higher). The value for Poland just exceeds that in Britain, a country with one 
of the highest levels of earnings inequality in the European Union (Eurostat, 
1998). The Czech Republic has a value equal to that for France in 1990 and 
above those in the same year for Australia and Germany. 
§ 4.3 Inequality of household incomes in transition 
How do the changes in inequality of households' incomes compare with those 
of employees' earnings? As with the pre-reform data, the change in the unit 
of observation and the inclusion of other sources of income may alter the 
picture considerably, and it is notable that the share of labour market earnings 
in total household income declined across a range of countries in the first half 
of the 1990s; Milanovic (1999) reports falls of 10 to 20 per cent. 
The impact of emerging unemployment may reinforce that from higher 
earnings dispersion if job losses are concentrated in households where other 
members are in the lower part of the earnings distribution. And if job losses 
are correlated across household members, the impact on household income 
inequality will be larger still. (An analysis of the changing numbers of 
workless households in transition economies, along the lines of the work by 
Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) for OECD countries, would be of considerable 
interest.)  An increased importance of self-employment and capital income 
can be expected to have the same effect. On the other hand, redistributive 
taxation and cash transfers may pull back the rise in overall income 
inequality beneath that of earnings. 
As with the discussion of earnings, we look first at Central Europe. Figure 
9 shows Gini coefficients in the 1990s for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland, together with those for the 1980s shown earlier in Figure 5. The data 
for the 1990s, as for the earlier decade, refer to income per capita, although  
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this adjustment may now be harder to defend due to the reduced importance 
of subsidies for housing and fuel.   
 
Figure 9: Gini coefficient for the individual distribution of per capita income: 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 1980-1997 
 
Note: In the case of Hungary, results for 1982-87 are from the income survey (as in 
Figure 5) and those for 1987-97 are from the budget survey. 
 
Source: See Figure 1 and Appendix B (except for the budget survey figure for 
Hungary for 1987 which is from Milanovic, 1998, Table A4.3). 
 
The sources are the same as before in the Czech Republic and Poland (the 
official microcensus and budget survey respectively) although coverage may 
well have changed – we pointed out the extension of the Polish survey to full 
coverage of the self-employed in 1992 and the fall in response in the Czech 
microcensus during the 1990s.  In the case of Hungary, the source for 1987-
97  - the official budget survey - differs from that used in Section 2 - the 
official income survey. The Gini coefficient for the overlapping year, 1987, 
differs by over 3 per cent points. Hungarian statisticians stress that the 
income survey was the superior source at this time. 
Hungary stands out as registering only a modest rise in dispersion of 
individuals' per capita incomes, a change in the Gini of 3 per cent points over 
1989-97, (or 4 from 1987) which may be compared with that for employees' 
earnings over 1988-97 of 8 points. There was even a fall between 1989 and 
1991, whereas the rise for earnings was continuous. And the average annual 
increase over 1991-97 was little more than that for 1982-87. 
Growth in income inequality was more marked in Poland, with the Gini 
rising 6 points in the eight years from 1989, although here too it fell initially 
– when earnings inequality was rising – and the increase to 1997 was again 


















point rise in the per capita income Gini, between 1988 and 1996 (as does the 
Gini for earnings), with the rate of increase the same as that for Hungary over 
1991-97. 
Do other sources for the three countries give similar results to these? In the 
case of Poland, nothing can be done – the budget survey appears to be the 
only regular source of information on household incomes. We are unable to 
see, for example, whether the jump in inequality shown in 1993 is shared by 
another data set.
42 
Figure 10 shows results based on alternative sources for Hungary and the 
Czech Republic (these again refer to annual income per capita). For Hungary, 
our other source is the TARKI household panel survey.
43 This source shows a 
notably higher level of income inequality than the budget survey – the Gini 
coefficient is 7 to 8 per cent points higher, which is a big difference. The 
ranking reflects that of the income and budget surveys in 1987 (see also 
Andorka et al., 1996). But it is comforting to see that the two sources give a 
reasonably similar picture of the changes between the early and mid 1990s - 
a rise in the Gini of about 3 per cent points. 
For the Czech Republic, the budget survey is an alternative source to the 
microcensus. It has the attraction of providing information annually, allowing 
changes over time to be tracked more carefully, and of the data being 
collected through the year rather than through recall. But its sample design (a 
quota panel sample with no planned rotation) may well lead to inferior 
coverage, especially in the early 1990s. For 1993-97 we show our own 
estimates of the per capita Gini based on interpolating the distribution from 
grouped data, but for 1989-93 we draw on what are undoubtedly superior 
estimates by Garner (1998) and Garner and Terrell (1998) who use the 
survey microdata and in addition re-weight to improve their 
representativeness. The figures for the overlapping year, 1993, illustrate the 
sensitivity of results to the precise methods used. 
The budget survey shows a smaller rise in income inequality than the 
microcensus. The Garner/Terrell results show essentially  no change in 
income inequality to 1992, and a rise of just a half per cent point over 1989-
93. Our estimates for the later period show a change of a two and a half 
points over 1993-97. Neither the budget survey nor the microcensus support 
the finding from the 1996  World Development Report that we referred to 
earlier of a 7 per cent point rise in the Gini coefficient in the Czech Republic 
between 1988 and 1993, a finding based on taking two quite different sources 
for the two years. 
 
 
42  Figure 7 shows only modest growth in earnings inequality in this year, and totals for 
different headings of state social expenditures in cash show no sharp differences from 1992 
(Rutkowski, 1998, Annex 1). 





Source: Hungary: (a) TARKI panel results from Galasi (1998, Table 1) (Galasi’s 
table refers to the year of interview but since the annual income data cover the 12 
months to March we have given his results as referring to the year prior to interview), 
(b) budget survey results as in Figure 9. Czech Republic: (a) budget survey results for 
1989-93 from Garner (1998, Table 13.1) and Garner and Terrell (1998, footnote 30) 
and those for 1993-97 from Appendix B, (b) microcensus results as in Figure 9. 
 
Although the alternative sources for Hungary and the Czech Republic do 
show some differences, the broad picture is not dissimilar. The early phase of 
transition in the first part of the 1990s in these countries and in Poland saw 
small or even no increases in income inequality at a time when the earnings 
distribution was definitely widening, followed by larger increases.
44 (The 
microcensus results for the Czech Republic are an exception, in that they 
show a steady increase, but there are only two observations in the period 
under review.) Looking back at Table 3, the last values shown in Figure 9 for 
Hungary (0.25) and the Czech Republic (0.26) are at the high Scandinavian 
or low Benelux level for the late 1980s – towards the lower end of the OECD 
range, although the alternative source puts Hungary near the average. That 
for Poland (0.33), is around the level at that time for Australia, Canada, 
France, Italy, Portugal and the UK – above the OECD average. 
Garner and Terrell (1998) provide a careful analysis of different 
components of household income in the Czech Republic using budget survey 
data for the early transition period. (They also cover Slovakia, where the 
 
44  This is broadly in line with the conclusions of Boyle Torrey et al. (1996) who use 
microdata from a variety of sources for the three countries up until 1992.   
Figure 10: Alternative estimates of the Gini coefficient for the individual 































picture turns out to have been similar.) Decomposing the changes in the Gini 
coefficient, they show that increased inequality of labour earnings was 
largely compensated for by changes to the tax and, especially, the transfer 
system. 
The importance of changes in state transfers can also be seen in Poland, 
although here the story told in Milanovic (1998) and Rutkowski (1998) is 
rather different to the Czech one. The equalising impact in 1995 of all cash 
transfers taken together was less than in 1989. The figures are dominated by 
expenditures on state earnings-related pensions that rose sharply, from 7 per 
cent of GDP in 1989 to 16 per cent in 1994-95, becoming more concentrated 
on higher parts of the income distribution (Rutkowski, 1998, Tables 3.7 and 
A1-1). The equalising effect of other state transfers, however, increased. The 
same picture of contrasting impacts of changes in pensions and other cash 
transfers is found for Hungary over 1987-93 (Milanovic, 1998, Table 4.2) 
although in this case the changes for pensions were more modest. (Jarvis and 
Pudney, 1995, however, draw attention to the reduction in progression in 
personal income tax in Hungary since its introduction in 1988.) 
We turn now to Russia. Figure 11 shows the Gini coefficient for per capita 
income calculated from the official Family Budget Survey (FBS), which has 
many deficiencies, and the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS), used earlier to look at earnings, a source that should provide much 
more reliable estimates. The FBS figures refer to annual income, although it 
is unclear what this means given the enormous inflation experienced in 
several years. The RLMS figures refer to income over one month. (There are 
almost certainly other significant differences between the definitions of 
income in the two sources.) 
The FBS series shows a huge jump in the Gini between 1992 and 1993 of 
11 per cent points. After a further slight rise in 1994, it falls back somewhat 
in 1994-97 to around 0.38, effectively the value for the USA shown in Table 
3, the OECD maximum. The RLMS figures are substantially higher, by 4 per 
cent points in 1993-94, rising to over 10 points in 1996. (The difference is at 
its greatest in 1992, the year of price liberalisation, when the FBS data may 
be particularly suspect.)
45 Income inequality in Russia, judged by this source, 
was well above the top of the OECD range by the mid-1990s.  
 
 
45  Other figures from the FBS show a higher level of income inequality for 1992 than that in 
Figure 11. Our own estimate, based on tabulated FBS data labelled “average of quarterly 
figures”, is much higher (0.36).  Doyle (1996) estimates the Gini for per capita income from 
tabulated data for five different months in 1992 and reports a 9 point increase between March 
and August. (If the normal practice of Russian statistical office were followed to produce these 
data, the monthly figures would in fact represent income cumulated during the year to the month 
in question, but unadjusted for price changes.) The RLMS figure for 1992 refers to the summer, 




Source: See Appendix B for FBS figures. RLMS results refer to monthly income and 
are from Commander et al. (1999, Table 5, rounds 1 and 4-7). 
 
One obvious concern is the implication of price differences across regions, 
which are substantial. In December 1995, average food prices faced by the 10 
per cent of the population living in the most expensive regions exceeded 
those for the 10 per cent living in the cheapest regions by well over 50 per 
cent.
46  Moreover, inflation rates have varied substantially between regions, 
especially over the most rapid period of price change, 1992-93.
47 Does this 
mean that the dispersion of nominal incomes is much greater than that of real 
incomes?(The same question would apply in our earlier analysis of earnings.) 
It transpires that adjustment of household incomes in the RLMS for 
differences in regional prices results in only small differences to the 
estimated level of income inequality, and the calculations in Figure 11 are in 
 
46   This calculation is based on data on the cost of a 19 good food basket for one city in each 
of Russia's 88 regions (excluding Chechnya). (11 autonomous regions that contain only two per 
cent of the population are excluded from the calculation.) The distribution of prices is then 
calculated weighting the cost of each city's basket by its region's population.  We are grateful to 
Kitty Stewart for this information. 
47  The highest measured rate of consumer price inflation over the 12 months from December 
(Kalmykia Republic in the Volga region) was two and a half times the lowest (St. Petersburg) 
(Stewart, 1998, Appendix A). 

















fact  already based on incomes adjusted for differences in regional price 
inflation. 
The huge rise in income inequality in Russia comes as no surprise in the 
light of what happened to the distribution of earnings, shown earlier. But as 
in Central Europe, there were other factors involved. Milanovic decomposes 
the change in the Gini coefficient between 1989 and 1994 (1998, Table 4.2).  
The increased dispersion of earnings is certainly the main factor driving 
higher inequality but the changes in all other headings have a reinforcing 
effect: pensions, other cash transfers, and non-wage private sector income.  
The marked difference between the nature of the sources used for the two 
years – FBS in 1989 and RLMS in 1994 – may affect the results, but analysis 
of RLMS alone for 1992-96 by Commander and Lee (1998) gives a picture 
of the determinants of inequality in transition which is not inconsistent with 
that painted by Milanovic. In particular, Commander and Lee note the failure 
of public policy to counteract the effect of a greater dispersion of labour 
income: 
“even at the outset of transition, the redistributive effect of public policy appears to 
have been significantly smaller in Russia than in Central Europe.  Furthermore, over 
the course of transition, the evidence strongly suggests that with respect to transfers, 
there has been an unambiguous shift toward greater proportionality” (p.16). 
Pensions formed the major part of expenditures on cash transfers 
throughout the period. While in 1992 their effect was to reduce overall 
income inequality, by 1996 the opposite was the case.
48 This switch is as in 
Poland, but in Russia expenditure fell as a share of national income rather 
than rose  – from nearly 7 per cent of GDP in 1992 to 4.5 per cent in 1996 
(with the real value of the average pension falling by almost half). Spending 
on other transfers also fell relative to GDP and, for example, the proportion 
of families receiving family allowance payments in 1996 was less than half 
that in 1992 (Commander and Lee, 1998, p.7).
49 
How does the level of income inequality that emerged in Russia in the 
1990s compare with that in other former Soviet republics? A variety of 
estimates can be found for the latter, some based on surveys that seem to be 
descendants of the old Soviet FBS and some on the new surveys described in 
our discussion of sources. Milanovic (1998, Table 4.1) reports Gini 
 
48 This is not to say that transfers became unimportant at the lower end of the distribution – 
the share of transfers in total income continued to be at its highest in the lower quintiles. 
49 One striking feature of incomes in Russia during 1992-96 was the change in the importance 
of different sources of income, with that from employment falling by at least 10-15 per cent 
points, to below a half of the total, and while income from home production and the informal 
sector rose by a similar amount. (Although the direction of change is the same, the figures differ 
substantially between Mroz et al., 1997, and Commander et al., 1999.) The overall impact of 
these changes on income inequality seems to have been small.  
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coefficients for per capita income from the early part of the transition (1993-
95) for 10 other countries. The value for Ukraine in 1995 was much the same 
(0.47) as those in Russia based on RLMS for the mid-1990s. That for 
Kyrgyzstan in 1993 was higher (0.55). The other countries all had Ginis of 
less than 0.4 although only one (Belarus in 1995 with 0.28) had a value 
below 0.3, the OECD average shown in Table 3. While Russia and one or 
two other republics may be at the upper end of the range for the now 
independent states (a range larger than that at the end of the Soviet period), it 
appears that by OECD standards some substantial inequality in measured 
incomes was also present elsewhere.
50 
§ 4.4 Interpreting the evidence 
As with the socialist period, the qualification of “measured” incomes is 
important to note. What do the estimates of inequality of earnings and 
incomes from the transition period tell us about differences in economic 
welfare? We consider again price subsidies, non-wage benefits from work, 
and social benefits in kind from the state. We produce only limited evidence 
and inevitably we are in part just raising issues that need to be subjected to 
further measurement. 
The story with subsidies seems as if it might be straightforward. If 
subsidies in the socialist period were equalizing in their effect (even if they 
were not targeted on the lower part of the income distribution), their removal 
through price liberalisation will have had a regressive impact. The rise in 
inequality of economic welfare will have therefore been greater than that 
shown by data on cash incomes alone. 
Newbery (1995), however, concludes from an analysis of household 
budget survey data that price changes in Hungary over 1988-91 had relatively 
little redistributive impact, noting that this may be because the indirect tax 
system had already been reformed in the early 1980s. As we noted earlier in 
commenting on the socialist period, i t is the entire set of tools for 
manipulating the price system that should be the focus of attention and not 
just explicit consumption susbsidies. For example, the distributional impact 
of the new Value Added Taxes needs to be analysed. 
Some subsidies certainly remain. Schaffer (1995) reports that total 
subsidies (to producer and consumer) in 1993 in former Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland were about 3-5 per cent of GDP (down from 15 per cent 
 
50  The surveys for the countries we mention by name are all new ones and the estimates from 
them should not be compared directly with those from the 1989 FBS in Table 2.  In those 
countries for which there are also per capita expenditure data a switch to the alternative measure 
of household welfare that they provide would not greatly alter the picture. For example, the Gini 
for Russia in the RLMS is effectively unchanged (although that for Kyrgystan falls by a fifth).  
(The conceptual advantages of expenditure data are often stressed but the problems of 
measurement should not be underestimated.)  
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or more in 1986), and around the level of those in the European Union, with 
the bulk of those that were left due to “remaining price controls (notably 
transport) and social/political factors (notably housing)” (p.117). The 
distributional impact of those subsidies that are retained may differ from 
those that were removed. 
The housing market has seen significant continuing price intervention, and 
there is also the distributive impact of privatization of the state housing stock 
to be considered.  Pudney (1995) estimates the subsidy to households renting 
public sector property in Hungary in 1991 and concludes that the effect was 
equalizing (in contrast to Dániel's results for the 1970s reported earlier) 
although the absolute value of the subsidy rose with income level (a 
concentration curve below the 45 degree line). As Pudney points out, a key 
issue in considering the distributive effect of a market-orientated rent reform 
is what the state would do with the revenue from higher rents – one cannot 
simply focus on the removal of the subsidy alone. 
The period considered by Pudney was already one when the public sector 
owned only a small part of the housing stock in Hungary and in the event a 
large part of the remaining public sector housing at the start of the 1990s was 
sold off in the following years, rather than the rents being raised. Dániel 
(1997) reports that this privatization was on highly advantageous terms for 
the buyer, while existing owner-occupiers with state mortgages were offered 
a huge write-down of their mortgage debt in return for a switch to market 
interest rates. She makes illustrative calculations of the annualized value of 
the ensuing privatization using household budget survey data for 1989 
(taking into account a range of costs, including those of renovation due to the 
backlog of maintenance). These indicate a regressive impact. 
The housing sector underwent enormous change in Russia in the first half 
of the 1990s. Buckley and Gurenko (1997) argue that by mid-1992 the 
implicit housing subsidy to renters, already high by the end of the Soviet 
period, had risen h ugely, since nominal rents were unchanged in the 
liberalization of prices beginning that year. Data from round one of RLMS, 
collected in Summer 1992, show average expenditure on rent and utilities as 
a percentage of total average expenditure to have been only 2.8 per cent 
(Mroz et al., 1997, Figure 3). Buckley and Gurenko's estimate of the value of 
the subsidy “income” to renters in 1992 reduces the Gini coefficient of per 
capita income in RLMS by 6 per cent points (a figure that of course depends 
on a whole series of assumptions), and they argue that housing policy at this 
time therefore provided an important cushion against the consequences of 
transition. 
Subsequent events included a (literal) give-away privatization of massive 
proportions of the public sector housing stock. By late 1996, only a third of 
Russian households lived in housing owned by the state or by enterprises and 
well over half owned their own homes, compared to figures of two-thirds and  
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a quarter respectively in 1992 (Mroz et al., 1997, Table 9). Buckley and 
Gurenko argue that its give-way nature, coupled with the prior distribution of 
housing, imply that this privatization was strongly progressive. This is 
supported by the results of Struyk and Daniell (1995) who analyse a random 
sample of several thousand dwellings from seven cities (including Moscow 
and St. Petersburg) collected at the end of 1993 (the year in which 
privatization appears to have peaked). They find no clear evidence linking 
income (or occupational status) of the household to the probability that the 
dwelling had been privatized. 
The Russian privatization, including the terms under which it took place, 
underline the importance of taking into account imputed rent from owner 
occupation in calculations of households' incomes, as recommended in UN 
guidelines (United Nations, 1977), although this is not in general the practice 
in Western countries either.  If only the “subsidy income” for renters is taken 
into account, then the Russia privatization would appear to have worsened 
the distribution of income, as households lose their rent subsidy and have no 
other income imputed in its place. 
Large subsidies appear to have remained for those still renting in Russia in 
the mid 1990s. Commander and Schankerman report expenditures on 
housing subsidies to have been 4 per cent of GDP in 1995, and “on a rising 
trend” (1997, p.2). RLMS data show households' average expenditure on rent 
and utilities as a percentage of the total to have risen to only 5.8 per cent by 
end 1996 (Mroz et al., 1997,  Figure 3), although the smaller proportion of 
renters at that time needs to be borne in mind. 
We noted in Section 2 the importance of non-wage benefits from work 
during the socialist period.  Part of this importance (or one of the reasons for 
their existence) should have declined during transition with price 
liberalisation and the increasing variety of goods available for purchase on 
the open market. But the general view is that fringe benefits from employers 
did not decline as quickly as expected (Commander and Schankerman, 1997, 
Rein et al., 1997). Nor did these benefits remain a feature of state enterprises 
alone. Evidence from various countries show both privatized firms and new 
firms supplying non-wage benefits as well, although not necessarily to the 
same extent. 
The reasons for the continued importance of non-wage benefits seem 
mixed. They include inertia and weak alternative state social support (for 
example in Russia) on the one hand, and, on the other, both the desire to 
retain or attract staff and the managers' views of the role of the firm towards 
its employees. While the latter reasons may appear to be an inheritance from 
the past, neither are out of line with good management practice in Western 
market economies, although the scale on which the benefits are paid may 
differ. In some transition countries there have been tax incentives (intentional 
or otherwise) to managers to pay part of employees' remuneration other than  
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through wages (a feature also familiar from the West). For example, Standing 
(1996) argues that this was the case in Russia with the excess wage tax, as do 
Filer et al., (1997) for the Czech Republic. 
As one might expect, the situation from country to country in the mid 
1990s displayed substantial variation. Earle (1997) using aggregate data on 
the Czech Republic and Romania for 1992-93 argues that “every type of 
measured benefit falls within the Western range” (p.69). On the other hand, 
Russia and (even more so) Ukraine still saw extensive provision, especially 
(but not only) that part of the subsidised housing referred to above that 
remained with enterprises. The desire to provide continued access to fringe 
benefits appears to have been an important reason for avoiding lay-offs. 
Nevertheless, enterprise survey data showed some declines for Russia over 
1991-94 (Commander and Schankerman, 1997). (See also OECD, 1996b.) A 
feature that seems to have been common to all transition countries is a very 
large withdrawal by enterprises from provision of pre-schools 
(kindergartens). A good number were divested to local authorities but many 
closed.
51 
There is less direct evidence on the distributional impact of fringe benefits 
in transition (as opposed to indirect evidence from the link with firm size or 
type). Two studies for Russia in 1994 indicate that fringe benefits went to 
better paid workers. Commander and Schankerman (1997) report the number 
of benefits provided by industrial firms rising with the average firm wage.  
Kolev (1998) uses data from a random sample of employees and finds a clear 
positive relationship with the monthly wage for the probability of receipt for 
various benefits (but not for housing), even when controlling for other 
characteristics that could be correlated with wages. (Without these controls, 
the probability of receipt rises between the bottom and top quarters of the 
wage distribution by a factor of 1.5 to 4.0, depending on the benefit 
concerned, falling only for housing.)  More evidence of this type is needed. 
Kolev then goes on to try to estimate the value of fringe benefits using 
respondents' evaluation of their job satisfaction. He finds that all fringe 
benefits are positively associated with higher reported job satisfaction and 
that very large increases in the wage would be needed to compensate for the 
benefits' removal. While self-reported satisfaction may be a rather weak 
proxy for indirect utility, the analysis resonates with the comment of Rein et 
al., (1997) that the value of fringe benefits to workers may differ from their 
 
51  Across the CIS as a whole, there were 32,000 fewer pre-schools in 1995 than there had 
been in 1991.  The example of Kazakhstan illustrates the decline of enterprise kindergartens, 
much the more important type at the end of the Soviet period.  Their number fell by nearly 60 
per cent over 1991-95 while the number of local authority facilities rose by only 10 per cent 
(UNICEF, 1998, Figure 2.5). (The enrolment rate of pre-school children fell by 30 per cent 
points.) Remaining enterprise kindergartens in Kazakhstan appear to have provided places that 
were still heavily subsidised (Klugman et al., 1997).  
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measured cost to firms. It is the former that we are most interested in while it 
is the latter on which the analysis of firm data – the standard approach – 
focuses. 
Finally, we consider social benefits in kind in the form of education and 
health. This is another example of an issue where more w ork is needed.  
Although there has been a lot of interest in reforms to education and health 
systems in the transition countries, published work on the new distributional 
incidence of state expenditures, similar to that, for example, of Milanovic 
(1995) for the socialist period remains thin on the ground, although internal 
World Bank reports have considered the issue. 
One might certainly expect there to have been some changes. In the case 
of education, there were some marked falls in total expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP in some countries in the first half of the 1990s – Georgia 
and Armenia were probably the worst cases, with a virtual collapse in state 
expenditures due to a precipitous decline in tax revenue (UNICEF, 1998, 
Figure 2.10). Of course, the value of the educational benefit may not be well 
proxied by expenditure but it would indeed be surprising if the distributional 
incidence of these changes were neutral.
52 Enrolments also fell in a number 
of countries, with declines at all levels of schooling in parts of Central Asia 
and the Caucasus. Overall, the number of children of school-age rose in the 
transition countries as a whole in the first half of the 1990s but the number of 
children enrolled in school fell (Cusan and Motivans, 1999). 
There is varied evidence suggesting a growth in inequalities in education 
systems in the 1990s, especially in the former Soviet republics and poorer 
parts of South-East Europe, implying that the incidence of state spending on 
education may have shifted in a regressive  fashion (UNICEF, 1998).  
Enrolment and attendance may have fallen off in particular in lower income 
households due to a rising price of education and falling and more unequally 
distributed household incomes. On the price side there has been formal and 
informal charging for places or for teaching, both in schools and in tertiary 
level institutions (formal charges in compulsory level schooling still seems 
absent), and large increases in the real costs of textbooks, children's clothing 




52  One concrete benefit from schools that is relatively easy to value is free-school meals.  
There have been notable falls in provision in many countries, especially in the successor states of 
the former Soviet Union.  For example, the proportion of children in primary schools receiving 
such meals fell by around 15-20 per cent points over 1989-96 in Russia and Belarus and by 50 
points in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (UNICEF, 1998, Figure 2.15). Since there have been no 
compensatory increases in state transfers to families it seems safe to label these changes as 
regressive, given the typical position of children in the income distribution.  
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5.  Conclusions 
We saw in Section 2 that it was dangerous to generalise about income 
distribution in the socialist economies, especially in relation to market 
economies since these too display considerable heterogeneity. As far as 
earnings of full-time workers are concerned, dispersion towards the end of 
the socialist period in the countries that have been most studied in the 
literature matched that in several OECD economies  – the decile ratio in 
Czechoslovakia was essentially the same as that in G ermany, Poland the 
same as Australia, Russia the same as Britain. Dispersion in Britain and 
Russia (and in the rest of the Soviet Union) was much larger than in 
Germany or Czechoslovakia – and in the other Central European countries.  
In both parts of Europe, East and West, earnings were less dispersed than in 
North America. 
But this was the picture at only one point in time and we emphasized the 
significant changes that had taken place in the distribution of earnings in 
several of the socialist economies. Nor was the situation stable in the OECD 
area. There is no fixed socialist versus market comparison to be made. 
The picture for household incomes was clearer, at least for the 1980s –  the 
socialist countries that we have covered in this chapter were apparently more 
equal than was typical of OECD countries, with a difference between the 
mean per capita Gini coefficient of 7 per cent points, although the 
Scandinavian and Benelux countries were at about the same level as the 
socialists. 
Not only does this conclusion refer to just one period but it also refers to 
measured incomes only. We emphasized the importance of accounting for 
subsidies (and indirect taxes), fringe benefits and social income in kind. 
These change the picture in a way that defies easy summary. The same is true 
for market economies although the extent to which conclusions are affected 
may be less.   
Although earnings inequality increased through the 1990s, the scale of the 
effect of the transition varied greatly. While the decile ratio rose by the order 
of 30-50 per cent between 1980 and 1997 (mostly after 1989) in Central 
Europe it doubled in the Ukraine and quadrupled, as least temporarily, in 
Russia although we noted reasons for doubting the veracity of everything one 
sees here. 
The switch to the broader concept of household income dampens these 
changes, with an increase of around 25 per cent recorded in the per capita 
Gini coefficient in Central Europe and 100 per cent in Russia. The Central 
European countries by the late 1990s were well up into the OECD range for 
income inequality. Russia was well above it and there can be little doubt that 
this is now a very unequal country (even if the situation under socialism is 
still open to debate). This relatively simple message has to be qualified,  
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however, by the fact that there is (or was as of 1997) perhaps more evidence 
that Russian inequality was stabilising than was true for the less dramatic 
rises in Central Europe – although the different Russian sources do not tell 
the same story. And again we emphasized the need to consider other forms of 
income that affect the distribution of economic welfare and the difficulties in 
doing so. The issue of housing illustrates the problems, including the failure 
of the data to capture the impact on the distribution of income of housing 
privatization. 
We have not found satisfactory analytical models encompassing enough 
features of the transition, such as combining the relative price effects of 
liberalisation with the distinctive wage setting processes of state  and 
privately owned enterprises to generate an evolving pattern of inequality.  
This is a major deficiency that has not only deprived us of an effective 
analytical framework within which to consider the evidence but also limits 
the treatment of distributional considerations which may constrain 
government policy. Dewatripont and Roland (1992, 1995 and 1996) (and 
others) have considered how changes in ownership structure may modify 
attitudes to successive phases of reform. 
The study of changes in the transition countries, or the comparison of 
socialist and market economies, involves data sets that are not strictly 
comparable. This underlines the data problems to which we have referred 
many times. Such problems are serious both at the conceptual and at the 
practical level and considerable care is needed with those data that are 
available. 
The data problems would be even more serious if we were attempting to 
compare the levels of income before and after rather than relying, as we do, 
exclusively on indices of relative dispersion. We know, however, that indices 
of per capita GDP, though also presenting statistical problems, fell in all 
cases. Poland recovered and passed its previous peak first, and recovery was 
general in Central Europe in the mid 1990s – but not in the CIS. 
We have not presented data such as mortality or morbidity, which would 
reinforce the welfare implications of falling GDP and rising inequality, 
especially for the countries of the CIS. These are relevant to the “capability 
approach” to human welfare described by Sen in the first chapter of this 
handbook.  It might be that the distribution of capabilities has widened more 
than that of incomes and this would be an interesting hypothesis to 
investigate. 
We started by saying that we were reporting on an episode of changing 
income distributions in a particular group of countries. An episode of a 
relatively concentrated period of change such as typified those occurring in 
the course of the long runs of data reported in other chapters of this 
handbook. W e are not, however, tempted to make any claims for the  
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representativeness of the (incomplete) episode we have studied as an 






Suppose that each sector consists of numerous enterprises using equipment of 
different vintages earning different per capita quasi-rents at the unique 
competitive wage.  Suppose also that workers in each enterprise appropriate a 
proportion á of their per capita quasi-rent in addition to the competitive 
wage. 
In this case a wage subsidy adds less to profits and investment, and more 
to earnings and consumption, thus the condition for further employment 
subsidisation to raise output more than consumption becomes more 
demanding at s<(1-")b. 
As before, output rises by (w-s)dn, 
but now household income rises by (w-b)dn + á(n.ds-dt), where the second 
term is á times the net addition to profits on which tax, t, is levied. 
Revenue neutrality implies that dt + b.dn = n.ds 
So that household income rises by (w-b)dn + áb.dn 
and net profits rise if (w-s)dn>(w-(1-á)b)dn, that is if s<(1- á)b. 
If the minimum wage were driven by considerations of distribution of 
earnings amongst the employed, for example 
 
w=ße, where ß<l and e=average earnings, 
then, with á>0, w itself would rise with an employment subsidy: 
while as before output again rises by (w-s)dn   
household income rises by (w-b)dn + á(n.ds-dt-n.dw) + n.dw 
and n.dw = ßn.de 
where n.de = n.dw + á(n.ds-dt-n.dw) 
revenue neutrality again implies that dt +b.dn =n.ds 
so that n.de = n.dw + á(b.dn-n.dw) 
and n.dw = ß(l-á) n.dw + áßb.dn 
n.dw = áß.b.dn/(l-(l-á)ß) 
 
household income rises by 
(w-b)dn+áb.dn + (l-á)áßb.dn/(l-(l-á)ß) 
                              
so that net profits rise if s<(l-á)(1-ß)b/(l-(l-á)ß) 
 
thus there would seem to be scope for a profits-tax-financed employment 
subsidy even if quasi-rents are shared with labour and rising average earnings 
raise the de facto minimum wage as long as the relevant coefficients are not 
very close to unity.  For instance á=b=1/2 makes the necessary condition that 




This appendix gives data points for the transition period that are not 
otherwise reported in published sources given in the sources to the Figures. 
 
1.  Distribution of earnings of employees (Figures 7 and 8) 
 
Q90/Q10  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
                   
Poland  2.43    2.85  2.91  3.01  3.40  3.35  3.48  3.53 
Hungary    3.40    3.56  3.70  3.75      4.17 
Czech Rep.  2.43    2.60  2.75  3.20  3.14  3.70  2.86  2.98 
Russia  3.33  3.36  4.28  8.17  15.55  9.41  9.96  9.60  10.40 
Ukraine        3.12  5.51      5.74   
                   
Q90/Q50 
(%) 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
                   
Poland  159.0    175.5  179.0  181.6  195.9  196.2  199.1  200.3 
Hungary    196.4    201.5  204.9  205.6      214.4 
Czech Rep.  148.7    163.3  167.3  182.4  181.2  179.2  173.1  173.7 
Russia  182.2  178.3  207.5  228.6  270.6  272.8  286.6  282.4  290.0 
Ukraine        177.9  219.4      234.4   
                   
Q10/Q50 
(%) 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
                   
Poland  65.4    61.5  61.5  60.3  57.6  58.6  57.2  56.7 
Hungary    57.7    56.7  55.3  54.8      51.4 
Czech Rep.  61.3    62.8  60.7  57.0  57.6  48.4  60.6  58.2 
Russia  54.7  53.1  48.5  28.0  17.4  29.0  28.8  29.4  27.8 









1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
                   
Poland  0.275  0.268  0.265  0.274  0.317  0.323  0.321  0.328  0.334 
Hungary  0.225    0.209    0.231  0.234  0.242  0.246  0.254 
Czech Rep. 
(MC) 
      0.228        0.258   
Czech Rep. 
(BS) 
        0.214  0.230  0.216  0.230  0.239 
Russia (FBS)  0.265      0.289  0.398  0.409  0.381  0.375  0.375 
 
Note: The two sets of figures for the Gini coefficient for per capita income in 
the Czech Republic are from the microcensus (MC) and the budget survey 
(BS). The former are calculations using the survey microdata reported in 
Veèerník (1998). The Russian FBS figures are from Frolova (1998). All other 
results a re from the files of the “MONEE project” at UNICEF International 
Child Development Centre, Florence. The project collaborates with statistical 
offices throughout the region and produces regular reports on social 
conditions and public policy in the transition in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union (UNICEF, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998).  
Inequality indices have been estimated from the grouped data collected by 
the project using the INEQ package written by F.A. Cowell, LSE, using the 
Pareto assumption both within ranges and for the top interval (see Atkinson 
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